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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
The Normative Justifications of Regret  
 
By 
 
Aaron Briley 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy 
 
 University of California, Irvine, 2019 
 
Assistant Professor Jeffrey Helmreich, Chair 
 
 
 
      Regret is a negative emotion that we generally experience after acting in ways contrary 
to our normative standards. Many scholars argue that this emotion has little, if any, 
practical or moral justification. As a result, it is on-balance unwarranted. Some scholars 
argue that regret is simply adding an additional pain to the first pain (when the regretful 
action was made) and is therefore impractical and unreasonable (Bittner 1992). Others 
argue that most of the regret we experience is inappropriate. If we regret what happens in 
the past from our current psychological and normative framework, it is inappropriate 
because we are no longer the same person, in the relevant way, who transgressed 
(McQueen 2017). However, little research has directly addressed the normative and 
practical justification of regret from the standpoint of one’s current value system.  
My project considers how regret should be viewed and why it is valuable. It also 
reorients the literature toward a more straightforward understanding of regret and 
regretting that most people appear to experience. In Chapter 1, I consider the regret skeptic 
and the common objections to regret. In Chapter 2, I consider how regret has been 
misunderstood and seek to consolidate a coherent and consistent definition. In Chapter 3, I 
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defend regret on the grounds that there is value in acknowledging the regretful act because 
of the way it activates and reorients us to what we value. I also show that there is value in 
learning from regret. This not only applies to making better choices in the future but also to 
improving our character as a result. In Chapter 4, I defend the view that being able to 
display regret is a social commodity because of its regulative and symbolic functions. The 
regulative and symbolic effects of regret are useful in our social and legal practices. It is 
only when we are in a position to consider the normative and practical benefits of regret 
that we are able to consider whether or not it is worth the pain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Why regret? That is, why regret at all? If one were to consult popular culture and 
self-help books the advice would be against regret. Everything from YOLO (“you only live 
once”) to FOMO (“fear of missing out”) to the slightly less popular carpe diem works to prevent 
this feeling in the first place. Part of the reason, I suspect, is that regret is understood as being 
unduly hard on oneself, i.e. “beating oneself up,” and this does not seem desirable or reasonable. 
This sentiment is also echoed in the literature. Spinoza, and his intellectual successors, consider 
regret to be essentially a bad feeling after an event; an event we can no longer change. And, since 
past events are not open to revision, it would seem like a waste of time to be pained by them. 
Moreover, given this unmitigated pain, it could make sense to develop a pill to erase all regretful 
memories and the pain they induce, then of course to take the pill. Erasing bad memories is 
incredibly popular. Movies that play on this desire, such as Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless 
Mind, have cult followings.1 
In response, I want to explore reasons we should regret. That is, I want to provide a 
justification for regret which will show it is reasonable to endure the attendant pain. There are 
three individually sufficient reasons in favor of feeling regret: value-in-recognition, value-in-
recognitional-learning, value-in-social display. Acknowledging one’s past misdeeds involves an 
assessment from one’s current point of view. As I explore in some detail, the process of bringing 
to bear our current normative standards on the events of the past helps to reaffirm our values. 
This, I argue, is valuable in itself. Second, what we gain from this painful exposure of 
acknowledging our misdeeds helps to fortify us against similar mistakes in the future. In 
                                                          
1 It is rated a top film of the 21st century by numerous organizations and many sites claim it to be a cult favorite. See: 
https://www.joe.ie/uncategorized/cult-classic-eternal-sunshine-of-the-spotless-mind-33102 
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addition, our characters are strengthened through this learning process and we become better, 
more virtuous agents because of it. Third, regret, specifically its display, communicates 
information about the agent who feels it. This information is valuable in all forms of 
interpersonal interaction where regretful feelings are appropriate. Displays of regret are useful to 
those members where regret should be displayed and where others want authentication. This is 
because the display of regret communicates our internalized normative conditions. Our 
relationships with others depend on the accessibility of this information.  
The structure of my dissertation will consist of four parts:  
Part 1: I respond to the skeptic. Spinoza and the neo-Spinozians claim that it is 
unreasonable to feel regret for various reasons. Here I outline their argument, then challenge the 
basic assumption on which it rests. Namely, I challenge their claim that moral facts are amenable 
to similar cognitive mechanisms as non-moral facts. Ultimately, I rely on Gary Watson’s view, 
among similar others, to argue that recognizing moral facts is a non-contingent type of valuing.  
Part 2: Here I set out my own view of regret while considering other prominent views in 
the literature. I show that at least one prominent theory of regret vindicates the skeptical concerns 
of the prior chapter. I end with what I take to be a promising account of regret not only to resist 
the skeptics but also to have explanatory power when encountering unusual cases in the 
literature, such as the well-meaning psychopath and the thorny issue of agent-regret.  
Part 3: I argue, against the skeptics, why we should experience regret. Here my account is 
divided into two parts: value-in-recognition and value-in-recognitional learning. Recognition is a 
process where the agent recognizes the values or reasons on which he failed to act. As I 
explicate, through this process, he gains the values of clarity and self-reconciliation. These 
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values are explored through two fictional cases: a scene from the Iliad and the case of agent-
regret.    
Part 4: I argue for the social value of displaying regret. Here, I show that displaying 
regret in a social domain is akin to a performance and because of this differs in kind and not 
degree from regret’s personal manifestations. By analogy to etiquette, I argue that regret has the 
values of regulating social interactions and symbolic representation. Both values are means to 
achieve more social harmony. I then address the potential objection of the well-behaved 
psychopath who seems insincere in his actions. This is because his life’s purpose and his speech 
acts do not seem authentic. After discussing various responses, I conclude that the well-behaved 
psychopath does meet conditions for authenticity, both in his broader behavior and in his speech 
acts.    
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Chapter 1: Skepticism: Regret, Who Needs It? 
 
I. Introduction 
The value of regret is denied both in and out of academia. Many commentators hold that 
there are no adequate grounds to regret and therefore question the moral and practical legitimacy 
of the emotion. I will refer to them as “skeptics” in the sense that they deny regret has value. 
That is, they deny that there are adequate grounds on which one should regret.1 In this chapter, 
my goal is to outline claims made against the value of regret and indicate why I find them 
unconvincing.2 I consider three positions that deny the value of regret. They are: regret as 
impractical, regret as inappropriate and regret as inherently bad.  
The first position claims that regret serves no practical function. Rudigar Bittner, 
Spinoza, Nietzsche et al. argue that regret is impractical and we are better off without it. The 
second position denies the appropriateness of regret. Here, I focus on Paddy McQueen who 
argues that regret is appropriate only in cases where the regretful feeling and its object have the 
right relation. If these relations are not maintained, then the emotion is inappropriate. The type of 
aberrant relation under consideration is what I call “act-value asynchronicity.” The final position 
is that regret is inherently bad. Given the choice, we should always prefer the good over the bad. 
Therefore, we should always choose not to regret instead of regretting.3  
These positions are not intended to be exhaustive. Admittedly, there are many objections 
against regret one can make depending on the discipline and context in which it appears 
unsatisfactory. For example, the disciplines of economics, psychology and literature have much 
                                                          
1 This assumes that they are speaking about the same thing when using the word “regret.” I define regret in the 
following chapter. 
2 My full response, however, is presented in subsequent chapters where I argue that regret is justified on both 
prudential and normative grounds. 
3 This is to be differentiated from the first concern in that the first is impractical and therefore bad, while the other is 
bad whether or not it produces satisfying effects.  
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to say about the benefits and harms of regret but are not considered here. Instead I focus on what 
appears to be prominent in the philosophical literature.  
One more point to be raised at the outset. There is a type of skepticism toward regret 
prevalent in the culture that seems to equate regret with the more extreme versions of self-blame, 
obsessive reflection, inordinate suffering and in some cases complete mental breakdown. While 
these conditions are possible, they represent something beyond the norm and will not be the 
focus of this chapter. I am concerned with the emotional experience that results from recognizing 
that a past action violates one’s current values. Recognizing that this occurred, i.e. recognizing 
that one has acted in a way that is inconsistent with one’s current self, causes a negative 
emotional response. The intensity of the response is undetermined. It is a mistake to equate this 
emotion with its extremes while undervaluing or ignoring the less extreme, standard instances. 
The less extreme versions are my target.  
II. Regret as Impractical 
In “Is it Reasonable to Regret?” Rudigar Bittner argues that regret is unreasonable on the 
grounds that it is both bad and impractical.4 First, it is bad because it is a negative emotion and 
we should not bring more negativity into the world.5 Second, it is has no practical value – 
although it may coexist with practical benefits, regret is not doing any of the heavy lifting, so to 
speak. Hence, regret is unreasonable on both accounts. In this section, I focus on the 
impracticality of regret.  
To put his objection in context, Bittner presents an argument in favor of regret’s 
usefulness. I will outline this argument, then show why Bittner rejects it. Regret is useful because 
it makes us more prone to behave better in the future: “To regret something bad that one did is 
                                                          
4 Rudiger Bittner. "Is It Reasonable to Regret Things One Did?" The Journal of Philosophy 89, no. 5 (May 1992). 
5 This is addressed in the latter section of this chapter.  
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reasonable because it makes it more probable that one will do better in the future.”6 The 
argument in schematic form: 
P1. Regret causes one to recognize mistakes (because the negative affect directs one’s attention to the 
misdeed)  
P2. If one recognizes mistakes, one is more likely to learn from those mistakes 
P3. If one is more likely to learn from those mistakes, then it is more probable that one will do better in the 
future 
C. Regret makes it more probable that one will do better in the future 
On its face, this argument seems sound. Moreover, something like this is claimed in the current 
psychological literature.7 Regret seems to improve our future behavior because the pain we feel 
is uncomfortable and we act in ways to avoid its repetition.8  
However, Bittner disagrees:  
Regret does not in fact make doing better in the future more probable. The impression that it does arises 
from a confusion of…[a] reasonable person who does not regret with an immoral or heartless one. No 
doubt somebody who does not see anything wrong in what he did or has no sense for the suffering he 
caused is likely to do similar things again. That is not the case of the reasonable person who does not 
regret, however. He understands what he did, he knows that it was bad, it just does not pain him.9 
Bittner resists P1 in the above argument because he disagrees that the negative affect necessarily 
directs one’s attention to the misdeed. It is a confusion to think that only people who regret care 
about their misdeeds – those who do not regret also care. Bittner’s point is that without regret 
one can still care about what happened, if one is reasonable, attend to it, learn from it and not 
repeat it in the future. All of the benefits of regret can occur without the negative feeling because 
that is not a necessary condition for recognizing a prior misdeed. 
                                                          
6 Bittner, “Is It Reasonable to Regret Things One Did?” 266. 
7 Claims like this are made in the psychological literature on regret. See: Marcel Zeelenberg. "Anticipated Regret, 
Expected Feedback and Behavioral Decision Making." Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 12, no. 2 (1999): 93-
106. Regret theory in economics has also shown that people can seek ways to correct the regretted behavior after it 
has happened or they can affect their choices before the decision is made through anticipating the regret that would 
come if they make a particular choice. See: Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden. "Regret Theory: An Alternative 
Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty." The Economic Journal 92, no. 368 (1982). 
8 However, whether it is the case does not imply that it should be the case, nor does it imply that it is the case 
necessarily. 
9 Bittner, 267.  
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However, this objection is problematic. It assumes that during an act of evaluating our 
past experiences it is possible to isolate (and disregard) the affective component. This 
assumption need not be true. Many have argued that this is not the case because any act of 
attending to normatively described states of affairs involves an attendant emotional response. If 
this is the more reasonable understanding, then Bittner’s skepticism would be unjustified.10  
Regret is also said to be practical because it helps to retain our sense of self.11 In this way, 
regret is useful as a means to maintain our diachronic identity. In his discussion of agent regret, 
Bernard Williams states that not identifying with our past actions undermines our self in an 
important way.12 Here, Williams is referring to unintended actions which result from intentional 
ones, e.g. intending to drive a truck but unintentionally hitting a boy who wanders in the street. 
All of our past actions are part of our identity because they contribute “to the sense of what one 
is in terms of what one has done and what in the world one is responsible for, one must accept 
much that makes its claim on that sense solely in virtue of its being actual.”13 The claim is that 
our choices and actions implicate our identity although it may be difficult for us to accept. And, 
according to Williams, this is appropriate because if we had not chosen and acted, the effects – 
even remote ones – would not exist.  
Although Williams takes a controversial stance on the status of unintentional actions and 
whether or not these are constitutive of our personal identity, his thought about the relationship 
between what we do and who we take ourselves to be still stands. If we fail to affirm our past 
choices, and if we are a product of those choices, then we are failing to affirm aspects of our 
                                                          
10 I argue for this position in later chapters. My argument draws on the works of Gary Watson (1975) and Pamela 
Hieronymi (2001).  
11 This can also be seen as a moral reason insofar as character traits are virtues and virtues are moral. However, since 
virtues of character can have real world effects, I will consider them to be practical in this sense.  
12 Bernard Williams. Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981). 
13 Williams, Moral Luck, 125-126. 
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current identity. And failing to affirm unappealing past choices “suggest[s] a large falsehood: 
that we might if we conducted ourselves clear-headedly enough, entirely detach ourselves from 
the unintentional aspects of our actions…and yet still retain our identity and character as 
agents.”14 
However, Bittner objects that regret is necessary to unify one’s identity. He agrees with 
Williams that losing one’s identity and character as an agent is too morally costly. And both 
seem to agree that one’s identity is connected to one’s past choices. The difference is seems to be 
on whether our identity is necessarily connected to our past choices. Bittner thinks that we are 
not confined to our past if we refuse to be. For him, our identity is rooted in agency and we can 
choose to be whoever we want irrespective of our rigid past.    
He states:  
If your identity and character as an agent is something you may retain or fail to retain, then the option of 
retaining cannot be recommended on the grounds that thereby you acknowledge the truth about you…If 
you are in the position to retain or not, then you are not in the position to stay true to yourself by either 
retaining or not retaining. "You must become who you are," Nietzsche said, but the pathos of truth to 
oneself rests on an assumption, namely, that there is such a self to be true to, which it precisely undercuts, 
namely, by understanding truth to oneself as merely one option among others. Thus, Williams's warning 
that by not regretting we fail to retain our identity and character as agents turns out to be another case of 
frightening the children (italics mine).15   
There is some validity to the claim that the past events with which to identify is up to us and that 
our identity does not merely entail the blind aggregate of our choices or the circumstances into 
which we were thrust. There are some choices that do not resemble who we really are, yet under 
certain conditions we nevertheless make them. Those choices that are willful but made under 
adverse conditions would fall into this category.16 If I value human life, yet kill a home-intruder 
                                                          
14 Williams, 125-126.  
15 Bittner, 270. The quote of Nietzsche is from The Gay Science, as quoted by Bittner.  
16 Aristotle called these “countervoluntary” as to be differentiated from “involuntary” and “voluntary.” Broadie, 
Sarah, Christopher J. Rowe, and Aristotle. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002). 
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because I think he will harm my family, I have taken a life and I am a killer. Looking back, it 
may be reasonable to subtract this act from the ledger of my actions that constitute my identity 
because there is a sense in which this does not represent who I am. This is not what I would do 
under ordinary conditions.  
However most regret does not fall into this category. Most choices we make are not the 
result of hostile circumstances. Rather they are the result of misbehaving under ordinary 
circumstances. The insight from Bittner and others is that we can learn how to grow from our 
past mistakes to form ourselves into our own image.17 What we cannot do is rewrite our histories 
to change what we have already become. We can take the past and use it to mold the future. We 
cannot try to manipulate the past and use it to deny or reform the present. Contrary to Bittner, we 
are the inevitable result of the choices we made whether we refuse to identify with them or not. 
Another related issue is that of minor mistakes. Perhaps, Bittner’s insight is that small 
deviations from our values do not, and should not, factor significantly into our identity. This is 
because there is generally some latitude with respect to our normative principles – there is an 
acceptable range of behavior within which there is no cause for concern. Actions that are within 
this range but near enough to unacceptable behavior and actions that are beyond this range but 
close enough to acceptable behavior would be borderline regretful. But they are minor 
transgressions because the deviation from what is considered acceptable behavior is minor. Our 
identity should not be threatened by these transgressions (or near transgressions) because of their 
close proximity to the acceptable instantiations of the relevant normative principle. Such trivial 
errors are best dismissed because they do not reflect in a significant sense who we are.  
However, this too is not definitive for dismissing all of our past decisions. It depends on 
what the minor fault is and whether it reflects a more significant character flaw. Insofar as it is 
                                                          
17 I am referring to the existentialists who hold this radical view of choosing to be what we want.  
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not reflective of who we are, it should not be (and in most cases is not) a part of our identity. 
This seems to be the insight at the core of Bitter’s concern. But it does not mean that we can 
dismiss serious faults or that we can dismiss minor errors that our indicative or symptomatic of 
larger character defects. These should not be dismissed because they are integral to who we 
are.18        
III. Regret as Inappropriate 
Another objection is that regret is ill-fitting or inapt in at least some circumstances. This 
line of criticism does not reject the emotion completely, it only rejects the emotion under certain 
conditions.19 Paddy McQueen in “When Should we Regret?” argues that the appropriateness of 
regret is conditional.20 McQueen suggests that we should use what he calls the “justified decision 
perspective” which considers our practical identity and epistemic context at the time of acting as 
a means to determine when regret is appropriate. He states:  
[R]egret is inappropriate, and thus should be rejected, if the agent who is subject to regret about an action, 
A, was justified in undertaking the action at the time it was made, regardless of how she later feels about A. 
By ‘justified’ I mean supported by reasons grounded in an agent’s practical identity that were epistemically 
available to her when she was deciding what to do.”21  
 
His view is that one needs coherence between one’s actions and one’s reasons for acting at the 
time one acts for appropriate regret. For example, suppose someone grew up with a particular 
political view and voted in ways consistent with that view which subsequently helped to create a 
certain legal and political climate. Now, 20 years later, he is ashamed of the legal and political 
effects of his prior actions and regrets what he did. McQueen claims that this type of regret is 
                                                          
18 I return to this point in chapter 2.  
19 There could be stronger versions of this type of “aptness” skepticism which could rule out any form of regret. 
Such radical views are those that attack the memories on which regret is based, asceticism, i.e. deliberate acts of 
self-denial,  which denies the feeling of emotion, and perhaps any type of position opposed to the validity of the 
senses or opposed to realism about the external world.  
20 Paddy McQueen. "When Should We Regret?" International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25, no. 5 (2017): 
608-23. 
21 McQueen, “When Should We Regret?” 611. 
11 
 
inappropriate because what matters is the consistency between an agent’s actions and values at 
time of acting.  
In contrast, suppose: 
David typically avoids alcohol because he does not like its taste and he reacts badly to it. He gets 
intoxicated quickly, is an annoying drunk and has terrible hangovers. He goes on a first date with someone 
he finds attractive. His date orders a very alcoholic cocktail as an aperitif. In a bid to make a good 
impression, and against his better judgement, David orders one too. Soon after drinking it he is making 
inappropriate jokes, telling boring stories too loudly and generally making a very poor first impression. 
Waking up the next morning with a throbbing head, David strongly regrets his decision and angrily rebukes 
himself.22 
 
In this case, David’s regret is warranted because he knew at the time of acting that 
drinking alcohol was a bad idea because he has a strong tendency to act badly when he drinks. At 
the time, his goal was to make a good impression on his date and it was known to him that there 
was a high probability that drinking would impair his judgment. Regardless of how David now 
feels about drinking, his regret is justified because his values at the time he drank were violated. 
McQueen’s position seems to imply an asymmetrical relationship between feelings and the 
values which ground them. On his view, one can violate one’s values at T1, feel bad about 
violating one’s values at T2, acquire different values at T3 yet still feel bad about violating one’s 
prior values at T1. In other words, one’s feeling of regret is diachronic while the values that 
ground the regret are not.   
One difficulty with this view is that it is unclear why we would feel regret if our values 
and practical identity have changed. Why would I still regret an action in the past if I no longer 
care about it? The worry is that our feelings and evaluations would fall into distinct categories. 
                                                          
22 McQueen, 612. 
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When an agent thinks about a past misdeed given his current (and different) normative standard, 
this evaluative normative framework is inoperative with respect to his emotional response. He 
looks back to the past with indifference. The upshot is that one must generate the emotional 
response to a prior misdeed even in cases where one’s current normative framework does not 
support such emotions. One must feel regretful based on values one held in the past, irrespective 
of what one’s values are in the present. This scenario does not seem plausible. Rather, evaluative 
judgments and the feelings they generate are coextensive.23 
Another difficulty with this view is the inability to use regret to inform future choices. If 
my current state (e.g. my values, practical identity, etc.) is irrelevant to my feeling regret of a 
past action, then my current state cannot be influenced by my regret. And if this is true, then I 
cannot act on the basis of this to improve my future choices. This is because the pain from my 
past mistake acts as a cue to assist me in avoiding that behavior in the future. I remember what 
happened, it pains me and I use this as an input for future decision-making. Furthermore, the 
concept of improvement, itself, seems to rely on a reference point in the past – a reference point 
that is underappreciated by McQueen. When we improve we are comparing where we are now to 
an initial condition. It is through this comparison of our current values with our past values that 
we are able to evaluate our current state as an improvement or degradation. The point seems to 
be a conceptual one regarding the term “improvement.” It is relational term and requires one 
thing to relate to another. The concept of improvement is unintelligible otherwise. McQueen’s 
account denies both the ability of past regrets to inform future choices and our ability to improve 
from past regrets.   
                                                          
23 See: Pamela Hieronymi. "Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness." Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 62, no. 3 (2001): 529 and Gary Watson. "Free Agency." The Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 8 (1975): 205. 
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However, McQueen’s account does have its virtues. In specific cases we can look back 
on prior actions, consider the context, and realize that we should not beat ourselves up because 
nothing could have been done differently. It is insightful to capture temporally contextualized 
value-choices – if this were not the case, we would be burdened with regret from much 
childhood behavior (e.g. saying something mean as a 5 year old, indulging in temper tantrums, 
etc.). This insight should be retained while broadening McQueen’s view to encompass my 
account of regret; namely, that one should feel regret when a prior misdeed is identified and 
evaluated from one’s current values. To highlight the differences of our views, consider the 
following examples.   
Scenario 1: 
Fred is in high school and learns to read signs of disrespect from facial expressions. He 
interprets these social cues as invitations to physical confrontation and routinely obliges. 
This reflects the honor-based community in which he lives.24 He is congratulated by his 
peers and feels pride every time he defends his honor by threatening physical violence on 
those who appear to show disrespectful facial expressions. Fred, now 20 years older, 
reflects on his behavior and how it led him to physical injury and ultimately to jail. He 
regrets how he thought and behaved.  
On McQueen’s account, Fred upon looking back has no basis for regret. His values at the 
time he acted were consistent with his behavior which is all that matters. Although Fred now 
sees all of the destruction his prior worldview caused, he is not in a position to feel bad for what 
happened. Conversely, on my account, Fred should feel regret because his prior actions violate 
his current values and his view of his own personhood is diachronic. That is, Fred sees himself as 
                                                          
24 This happens to be the case of many inner-city youths. They live in what has been characterized as an honor-based 
system. See: Elijah Anderson. Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City. (New 
Yok: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000). 
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the same person in a significant sense across time. My account also makes sense of Fred’s regret 
now. On McQueen’s view, Fred could not feel regret for that event. If he did, it would be 
illegitimate and unjustified.  
Scenario 2: 
Mary has an affair on her husband and is devastated when she realizes what she has done. 
Although there were many reasons for her feeling alone, vulnerable and unappreciated, 
she nevertheless values trust and fidelity. She regrets letting herself down. Unfortunately, 
20 years later, Mary is going through her fourth divorce and she has come to the 
realization that love is a battlefield and it is every man for himself, so to speak. Now she 
values her immediate interests above another’s, is cynically disposed toward romance and 
shuns altruistic gestures that couples typically display.  
On my view, Mary would no longer regret the affair she had with her first husband that caused 
much grief. Her values are different now and she endorses infidelity. This means that she would 
not feel the pain associated with her remembrance. Looking back on her past, with her current 
values, does not produce a painful phenomenological experience. McQueen, however, would say 
that Mary still retains the regret of her youth despite not having the same values she had then. 
This would presumably be contrary to her current phenomenological experience.   
The virtue of McQueen’s view is that one is not morally or emotionally burdened by 
every errant decision made in childhood. Mistakes of judgement will necessarily appear when 
considering the event from the perspective of an adult and this should not be regretful. The virtue 
of my account is that it appreciates and takes seriously the emotional and moral continuity we 
feel when we often have regretful feelings. Moreover, on my view, regret functions to inform our 
decision making process. We can improve from what we have done in the past and regret 
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facilitates this process. Together, both of these views are complementary and capture a broader 
phenomenon of regret.  
IV. Regret as Bad 
The final type of objection considered is the view that regret is bad. Not “bad” in the 
sense that regret is unreasonable – all of the skeptical positions would agree to that. They would 
agree that regret is unreasonable on the basis of it being impractical or inappropriate, and for this 
reason they would agree that regret is a bad thing. The objection here is that regret is bad because 
it adversely affects one’s character.   
Paraphrasing Spinoza, Bittner states: “’To regret what one did is to be twice miserable’ 
means: a person is first miserable because he did something bad, and he is miserable a second 
time because he is in pain over what he did.”25 The idea is that pain is bad and bringing more of 
it into the world is worse because it affects our character regardless of the consequences that 
result from the pain. One way of understanding this objection is to think about the impact this 
pain and/or negativity has on our psychology. Specifically, the impact is has on our decision-
making processes. On a virtue ethical account, our practical reasoning and our dispositions are 
good if they perform well under the right conditions, in the right way, for the right reason, etc.26 
However, when we regret, these capacities are comprised. This is a reason to deny the value of 
regret.  
Such an idea is not far-fetched. Our contemporary understanding of how the mind works 
suggests that regret can impair our practical reasoning and character dispositions. Regarding the 
first, studies show that people engage is riskier behavior, i.e. their practical decision making is 
                                                          
25 Bittner, “Is It Reasonable to Regret Things One Did?”  
26 Aristotle frequently adds these types of specifications to stress the conditional nature of virtuous action. See: NE 
1104b25-27. 
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more incautious, when they regret a missed opportunity.27 Essentially, they attempt to “make-up” 
for missed opportunities by making choices where the perceived upside is bigger than it would 
normally be. This implies a greater downside and greater risk.28 Regarding the second, studies 
have shown that negative psychological states can lead to coping mechanisms called negative 
distracters.29 A distracter is a mental technique that redirects one’s attention from the negative 
thought believed to be responsible for the negative psychological state. Positive distracters are 
what agents consider positive distracting thoughts and negative distracters are negative 
distracting thoughts. With the use of negative distracters, a study found that:  
[A]lthough depressed college students were initially successful in suppressing negative material, they 
eventually experienced a resurgence of unwanted negative thoughts. Analysis of subjects' stream-of-
consciousness reports indicated that this resurgence was associated with the use of negative thoughts as 
distracters from the unwanted item.30 
What the college students discovered was that negative psychological states led to negative 
distracters which in turn led to the resurgence of the negative state. It is a circle of negativity. 
Insofar as the inability to suppress negative psychological states affects the context in which one 
performs virtuous (or any other) actions, one’s character is impaired from continually being in a 
bad state. Regret, it can be argued, plays a significant role in bringing about this bad state.   
In response to the suggestion that regret only serves to make us miserable, this is only 
plausible on a mischaracterization of regret. Regret is more than just a “miserable” feeling. If this 
feeling encompassed the totality of regret, then there would not be much in favor of the emotion. 
However, regret is not an emotional feeling that supervenes on the experience of looking back on 
                                                          
27 Aidan Feeney et al. “Knowing when to hold ‘em: regret and the relation between missed opportunities and risk 
taking in children, adolescents and adults,” Cognition and Emotion, 32:3, (2018): 608-615. Brassen et al. (2012) 
“showed that people take greater risks if they realise that previously cautious behaviour caused them to miss an 
opportunity to gain a larger reward, which they take to indicate regret responsivity in decision making.” “Regret 
responsivity” is the degree to which agents modify their future decision making in light of the regret they feel.  
28 Risk is being understood as the scope of potential loss. Hence, the bigger the potential loss, the bigger the risk.  
29 Wenzlaff, R. M. et al. “Depression and mental control: The resurgence of unwanted negative thoughts.” Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 55(6), (1988): 882-892. 
30 Wenzlaff et al., “Depression and mental control,” 882. 
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what we did, learning from it and using it to guide future behavior. It is part of the very process 
itself. In all stages of the process, this emotional feeling is necessary. It is necessary to evaluate 
salient events in our lives, to learn from our experiences and to prevent us, on pain of repeating 
the experience, from choosing similar courses in the future. The error of this view is to reduce 
regret’s multifaceted nature to just a painful feeling. A fuller treatment of how the cognitive and 
emotional aspects of regret interrelate are discussed in the chapter where I define regret.  
In response to the claim that stated a.) regret distorts our practical-decision making 
capacity and b.) regret distorts our character by skewing our dispositional orientation, our virtues 
are actually strengthened in these two respects not weakened. The claim that regret distorts our 
practical-decision making capacity is accurate under certain conditions but not others. When one 
makes a suboptimal decision while regretting, one relies on other suboptimal or errant traits to 
carry out the decision. Hence, this is not a failure of regret but a failure of the entire network of 
character traits, e.g., prudence, moderation, etc., that condition how one’s regret will be 
expressed. The context under which practical-decision making occurs is morally multifactorial.  
Agents are not confronted with one feeling (e.g. regret) which then results in one response (e.g. 
risky behavior). Instead, agents are confronted with the “complexity of the moral status of 
particular instances of risk-taking and [their] responsiveness to these contextual features.”31 How 
regret is assimilated into our preexisting moral and psychological framework will depend on the 
strength or weakness of that framework. If the framework is robust and virtuous, then regret will 
reinforce virtuous traits. If the framework is emaciated and weak, regret encourages vice. The 
full defense of this claim will unfold throughout the subsequent chapters.  
                                                          
31 N. Athanassoulis and Allison Ross. A virtue ethical account of making decisions about risk. Journal of Risk 
Research 13 no. 2 (2010): 217.  
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The claim that regret distorts our character by skewing our dispositional orientation also 
depends on our preexisting character. In a dispositional climate where negative feelings are 
counterbalanced with reflection, precaution, intensity or calm, the effects on one’s character is 
not deleterious. For example, if one is impatient and disposed to rashness, then being regretful 
over a missed opportunity will serve to activate one’s impatience and rashness in relation to 
one’s future choice. A rash future decision is a likely result. On the other hand, if one is patient 
and circumspect, it is unlikely that regret over a missed opportunity will cause one to be rash and 
impatient in the future. The dispositional inertia of patience and circumspection will not be 
halted and reversed from a single misdeed. If one’s character is permanent and enduring, then 
occasional miscalculations (resulting in regret) should not undermine the entire edifice.  
IV. Conclusion  
The skeptical objections considered in this chapter were not exhaustive. Instead, they 
were selected to highlight some central concerns. The first objection claimed that regret is 
impractical because it a.) does not improve future behavior and b.) does not help us to retain a 
sense of ourselves that is worth keeping. We saw that both objections fall short in trying to 
undermine the practicality of regret. The first because regret is conceptually connected to 
identifying a past event that one values. The second because our self-identity includes our past 
actions – we cannot pick and choose only the ones we approve. There are, however, times where 
we act “out of character” and perhaps these events can be deleted permanently from our regretful 
memory banks. These are exceptions and do not include most regretful choices which are 
indicative of who we are and comprise our self-identity.32  
                                                          
32 Major transgressions like murder might be an exception. Although it is out of character for most people until they 
do it, certainly this seems a worthy candidate for regretful out of character behavior. One way to think about this is 
to consider the feeling of regret to be on a continuum once a threshold is met. This threshold is a function of both 
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The second objection claimed that regret was inappropriate in cases where the agent 
acted in agreement with his practical identity and epistemic context. The criticism was that 
although an action might seem regrettable now (based on one’s current values), one should not 
evaluate a prior action on considerations (or states) that were not available to one’s former self. 
This view was insightful in certain contexts where one should evaluate a former action with the 
values one had at the time. However, on this view, it is unclear why one feels regret in the first 
place if one’s values have changed. Moreover, regret loses its decision-guiding function when 
we can no longer use our past pain as a future deterrent.  
Finally, we considered the view that regret is bad for our character and well-being. Here 
we considered two claims: 1.) regret impairs one’s practical-decision making ability, and 2.) 
regret corrupts one’s character apart from one’s practical reason. Both objections were shown to 
be conditional on the agent’s preexisting dispositional state. If the agent was previously disposed 
to prudent, circumspect and moderate behavior, the corrupting effect of regret on his decision-
making or on his character are minimal. It is only when one’s character is degraded through vice 
and immoderate forces that regret achieves the detrimental effect it is claimed to have. The 
purpose of this chapter was to sketch some prominent criticisms in the literature and to show that 
they are not conclusive. In the following chapters I will briefly revisit much of the material here. 
This chapter serves as the context for what is to come.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
how much of our character we think is implicated by the action and how extreme the transgression regardless of how 
much our character it expresses.  
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Chapter 2: What Is Regret?  
 
I. Introduction  
In the present chapter, I outline my account of regret while considering other prominent 
views in the literature. First, I state what I take to be the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
regret. Then, I clarify what this means through examples and through differentiating my view 
from plausible but less adequate accounts. Second, I explore the different accounts of regret in 
the literature which I categorize as: regret-as-feeling, regret-as-counterfactual and regret-as-loss. 
Here, I attempt to show the difficulties of the former two categories, and the virtues of the latter. 
The upshot is that the account I initially present is not only resistant to specific criticism but also 
has explanatory power when encountering unusual cases in the literature, such as the well-
behaved psychopath and the thorny issue of agent-regret which I address in later chapters. 
II. What is Regret? 
A. Other backward-looking emotions 
My aim is to understand emotions as we generally use them in ordinary conversation. So 
I will be concerned with looking at what are generally known as emotions and emotional states 
for the basis of my investigation into regret. These terms are sometimes called “folk emotion 
concepts” which describe the manner in which regret is commonly used and the role it plays in 
our everyday lives.1 It is in this context that our discussion takes place.  
Regret belongs to a family of retrospective emotions. These emotions are often seen as 
overlapping, so it will be necessary to clarify my target at the outset. The phenomenon I seek to 
explicate concerns a bad feeling about a past action. However, it does not necessarily detract 
                                                          
1 Andrea Scarantino and Ronald de Sousa, "Emotion", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018). 
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from one’s confidence or impugn one’s future choices in the way that shame does.2 Remorse, 
too, is different from regret; it is a narrower concept that falls under regret but has a distinctive 
moral significance. Remorse, then, I will treat as moral regret and is accommodated on my 
account below. Guilt is also a painful feeling about a past action, but guilt seems to involve an 
attitude of condemnation and can be publically administered. Regret on my view is not 
something that is necessarily deserving of this kind of attitude nor does it seem apt to have regret 
publically administered.3 It is also not self-reproach which involves resenting oneself because 
regret is not a “hostile feeling” aimed at “inflicting harm on the wrongdoer.”4 Since resentment 
seems to imply an object of resentment other than oneself, this will not be the phenomenon under 
discussion. I am interested in first-personal regret.5 Nor will it be embarrassment which is the 
thought “that I have done something that will lower the regard in which I am held by others.”6 
The type of regret that concerns us is not contingent on how we fare in another’s estimation. It is 
principally how we view ourselves.  
       B. Definition of Regret 
What I attempt to explicate, and defend, is the following account of first-personal, 
normative regret:  
To regret one’s action is to recognize one’s loss or lack of power to change the fact that 
one acted wrongly (or failed to act) by one’s current values and to be disposed to feel 
                                                          
2 I take shame to be something like “the feeling that comes with the consciousness of faults, weaknesses, 
disadvantages – that is, of qualities deemed undesirable.” They are reflected upon and the agent suffers “a constraint 
upon confidence and freedom of action.” See: Arnold Isenberg. "Natural Pride and Natural Shame." Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 10, no. 1 (1949). 
3 Herbert Morris. "The Decline of Guilt." Ethics 99, no. 1 (1988): 62-76. 
4 Eve Garrard and David McNaughton. "In Defence of Unconditional Forgiveness." Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 103, no. 1 (2002): 39-60.  
5 It is sufficient on my account that the present agent identifies with the prior agent in some respect. This account 
does not presuppose that the personal identity of the two agents remains identical in all respects across time.  
6 Mark Wynn. "Phenomenology of Religion." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed March 9, 2019.  
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pain in self-alienation, i.e. in one’s inability to reconcile oneself to what one and one’s 
life has become. 
Put schematically: 
1. Historical judgment: an agent, himself, Ø-ed or not Ø-ed (in the past)  
2. Evaluative judgment:  Ø-ing or not Ø-ing is wrong by this agent’s values and thus 
warrants consideration (i.e. what the agent takes to be correct) to be disposed to a 
negative emotion 
3. Valuation: feeling pain in self-alienation, as presumed to be appropriate 
First, to regret is to have a first-personal stance toward the actions of the past.7 It is an action 
or inaction that we do not like because it reflects poorly on how we see ourselves.8 This point is 
contentious. Bernard Williams, for example, makes a case for both first and third-personal 
regret.9 For Williams, what is essential to regret is its constitutive thought, “how much better if it 
had been otherwise.” And this thought can occur to the agent about his prior actions and also 
about other states of affairs that did not come about from him. For example, Williams’ lorry 
driver hits a boy who runs into the street. The driver is regretful – according to him, it would be 
better if it had been otherwise. And, the same event viewed by spectators is also regretful – 
according to them, it would be better if it had been otherwise. In this sense, regret is both first 
and third-personal.  
 However, this characterization seems problematic. When one says that he regrets an 
event that did not arise from his agency, it is difficult to understand the evaluation. Specifically, 
                                                          
7 Regret is usually experienced temporally, so I have accounted for this by referring to past actions. However, 
strictly speaking, examples can be constructed where a time-traveler can regret the future. What is important is that 
the misdeed cannot be changed.  
8 This which I will later describe as self-alienation is open to group agency where the individual acts as a member of 
a group and uses the first person plural, “we,” to denote what actions were performed in the past.  
9 Bernard Williams. Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981).  
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it is difficult to understand how this is different from sadness, sorrow or compassionate wishful-
thinking. Part of what is specific to regret, on my view, is that the agent is pained by a past action 
because it does not reflect who he takes himself to be. And since the opportunity has passed for 
him to act in a way consistent with who he is, he feels pain from this lack of power. It is crucial 
that there is a conflict between the two “agents” – the one in the past and the one in the present 
both with whom the agent identifies. On a third-personal account, we need to know how regret 
redounds to the agent in ways that sadness, sorrow and compassionate wishful-thinking do not, 
which seems unlikely.10 Therefore, my account excludes third-personal regret.11  
To be clear, first-personal regret can take the plural form. Group regret is also compatible on 
this view. Individuals who see themselves as constituting a broader whole and who identify with 
that whole in such a way that the group’s agency is seen as their own can have regretful 
experiences. This is from the recognition that, instead of the individual looking back and viewing 
himself in the past differently from his own currently accepted values, the group for which the 
individual is a member committed some past act that is contrary to how the group views itself 
now. Group agency when considered as “we” as opposed to “they” exhibits all of the necessary 
features of what I take to be in regret.12 
It is also important to distinguish backward-looking from “forward-looking” regret. 
“Forward-looking” regret is when an agent considers an action sometime in the future and 
                                                          
10 Interestingly enough, Williams, himself, seems to hint toward something first-personal as significant in regret. He 
states in Moral Luck, “The discussion is not in the first place directed to what we or others might say or think of 
these agents…but on what they can be expected coherently to think about themselves.” I take this last clause as 
indicative of the first-person perspective.  
11 Experimental results appear to support this intuition. “Self-caused” events increased feelings of regret more so 
than other agents or events. See: Ira J. Roseman. "Appraisal Determinants of Discrete Emotions." Cognition & 
Emotion 5, no. 3 (1991): 181.   
12 There are psycho-biological issues concerning the nature of the pain that would accompany group agency. 
However, supposing the power of the mind to fully accept the activities of the group into which it identifies, it is not 
difficult to imagine genuine pain in all of the members from a prior misdeed (of the group) of which each of them 
individually may not have taken part.  
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imagines himself regretting that action after having made it. Regret in this case is from the point 
of view in the future beyond when the imagined action is made. For example, let us say that I am 
tempted to eat the fruit tart that my spouse put in the fridge. However, I am lactose intolerant and 
rich custard does not digest well. The regret I experience now, at the present time, T₁, anticipates 
how I will feel at a future time, T₃, after having eaten the tart and suffered digestive pain at an 
intermediate time, T₂. This anticipatory type of regret is a current emotion about the effects of an 
imagined future action.13 
My account does not permit “anticipatory” regret – I am strictly concerned with looking to 
the past. This is because the pain of paradigmatic regret arises from a lack or loss of power in 
one’s ability to revise a past action (and ultimately become the agent with whom one identifies). 
With “anticipatory” regret, however, one retains the power to act in a way that is consistent with 
one’s self-conception because one has the ability to affect how the future will turn out. 
Therefore, the temporal restrictions of backward-looking regret, which provide the sense of 
powerlessness, do not apply to present or future actions.14    
To regret, as I have described it, is to be sensitive to normative considerations. These are 
considerations that reflect the value set of the agent at the time of reflection. These values are 
both moral and non-moral. Non-moral values seems appropriate because one could regret 
prudential considerations. For example, I could regret buying shares of a stock that 
underperformed. The choice I made in retrospect did not go as planned. My hastiness and 
deluded self-confidence during the stock purchase is not how I currently view myself. Common 
cases such as these are accommodated on this view.  
                                                          
13 This is not to be confused with what one commentator calls “prospective” regret which is regret for a future 
choice when the situation presents only regretful options. See: Daniel Jacobson. “Regret, Agency, and Error.” In 
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. vol. 1. edited by David Shoemaker (2013): 120.   
14 Unless, of course, time-travel is assumed whereby a possible example could be constructed so that one acts in the 
future and cannot change what happens once he returns to the present.  
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The evaluation that occurs in regret is that a past action is inconsistent with one’s current 
normative values. It is important to note that my account pertains to the actions of the agent, and 
not an event. By “event,” I mean the situation in which the agent finds himself and within which 
he acts. Take the well-known example of a tourist in the jungle who is told he must kill one 
person to save many, or everyone dies. The event (i.e. situation) itself is tragic.15 Although these 
scenarios are worthy of discussion, I do not take this to be paradigmatic regret. What an agent 
regrets are his unforced actions. He regrets making the wrong choice and doing the wrong thing 
when he possesses the power to do something else. Being in a situation where every possible 
choice is wrong relieves the agent of the burden of taking responsibility in the relevant way.  
But there is also a sense in which the agent does not regret his action, but regrets the 
(unforeseen) consequences of his action.16 In Williams’ example, the lorry driver non-
negligently hits the child. That is, the actions of the driver are not blameworthy. Nevertheless, 
the driver still feels regret. He feels regret in virtue of the consequences, although unforeseen, of 
his non-regrettable actions.  
I do not agree with this interpretation. There could be various reasons for his regret other 
than regretting the event that resulted. Initially, the driver could think he was blameworthy. He 
would not be certain, however, until carrying out the process of scrutinizing his actions and 
inactions prior to the event. Arguably, he would have regret-like feelings until his final analysis 
is reached exonerating him from blameworthiness. Another possible reason for regretting the 
                                                          
15 Bernard Williams discusses a case where the foreigner, Jim, is given the honor of killing an Indian in order to save 
the rest from being killed. See: J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams. Utilitarianism: For and against. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973). 
Some interpret this to be “regretful” because they see it as an expression of sympathy, sorrow or grief. On this 
interpretation of regret, see: Miles Little. "The Role of Regret in Informed Consent." Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 6, 
no. 1 (2008): 49-59. 
16 Amelie Rorty states that “objects of regret have two components, an event…and the agent’s action in bringing 
about that [event].” I disagree with this for the reasons above. See: Amélie O. Rorty. “Agent regret.” in A. O. Rorty 
(ed.), Explaining Emotions. Univ of California Pr. (1980): 489-506.  
26 
 
event that resulted is to regret the actions that produced it. There is a transitive property at work 
which makes the event regretful in virtue of the agent’s actions. And the agent’s past actions are 
evaluated in comparison with how the agent sees himself in the present. The gap between these 
two corresponds to the intensity of regret the agent feels. However, if there is no gap, i.e. if the 
actions of the past correspond to how the agent currently views himself, there is no regret – even 
if they result in a bad event. In other words, if the agent were able to go back in time, and make 
the same decision (knowing what he knows now), then the action is not a regretful one. In the 
lorry driver case, I would not call this regret because the driver would not (perhaps, could not) do 
anything differently if the scenario were repeated. However, if the driver still felt regret, then on 
my view, he would be mistaken. He may feel sorrow or irrational guilt, but it would not 
constitute regret on the account presented.17   
The evaluative judgment, that there is a normative inconsistency, warrants one’s 
consideration and disposes one to experience negative emotions. One is justified to focus 
selectively on a given past action because it is wrong according to what one thinks is important. 
This disposes one to feel bad. Therefore, regret need not be an occurrent feeling on this view – it 
can be dispositional. It becomes occurrent when the relevant conditions obtain, i.e. when one 
recalls the past event in the relevant way.   
The content of the emotion, the meaning of the negative feeling, is self-alienation. When we 
regret we understand that we can no longer make the decision that is better aligned with our 
values. The opportunity to make a better choice has passed. We are powerless to change it. The 
knowledge that we can no longer change who we have become is painful. We identify with our 
                                                          
17 I take guilt to be roughly an “attitude of condemnation and can be publically administered.” Since public 
condemnation of the lorry driver does not seem justified because he non-negligently hit the child, and if he 
nonetheless feels guilty, he seems to be mistaken. He acts (or feels) as though he were a valid object of public 
condemnation but he is not. Daniel Jacobson also argues this is irrational: “The lorry driver…can be expected to feel 
irrational but praiseworthy guilt,” in “Regret, Agency, and Error,” (2013). 
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self-conception (i.e. who we think we are), but from our past choices we are condemned to deny 
this. This is because our past presents a contradictory picture through the aggregation of our 
mistakes of who we think we really are. It is this self-alienation that is painful. The intensity of 
self-alienation corresponds to the degree in which we deviate from our self-conception.  
One difficulty for my account might be that it is too restrictive. Since the pain on this view 
comes from self-alienation, and self-alienation is an inability to reconcile my prior actions with 
who I take myself to be in the present, it seems like trivial regrets and anomalous misdeeds 
would not be accommodated. This is because minor faux pas do not factor into who I am in the 
present. It would be a mistake, the objection goes, to entertain self-alienation for accidentally 
reaching for the salt, when I wanted sugar, to put into my grandmother’s tea. Actions like this do 
not seem serious enough to count as self-alienating, yet they too seem regrettable.  
A further and related difficulty is that there is a sense in which our past events shape all of 
who we are. If this is correct, then our current normative perspective from which we evaluate our 
past actions itself is shaped by the regrettable decision. Therefore, it is difficult to see how deep 
this self-alienation goes because my current self is the sum of all of the choices of my former 
selves. 
Both objections are related to the same problem; namely, how to understand our personal 
identity over time with respect to our choices. Although a detailed discussion exploring the 
various relevant issues in the personal identity literature will take us too far afield, and thus will 
not be attempted, there are two points I can make in response.18 First, with minor faux pas, it is 
correct to assume that these events can and do exist. There are numerous lapses in judgment or 
                                                          
18 Questions of identity, including whether or not we can preserve our identity over time, are interesting but thorny 
issues. The only presupposition in this work is that the agent recognizes himself (and his agency) enough in his past 
actions to warrant pain and feelings of alienation (if he does not like what he recognizes). I do not, however, take a 
position on the degree to which this similarity obtains.    
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careless mistakes with which I do not identify. And it would be odd to feel self-alienation from 
such minor errors. Minor errors that are not seen to be reflective of one’s judgment would 
scarcely be remembered much less regretted. I would be able to have the historical judgment 
about what occurred, and I would evaluate it as being inconsistent with my current normative 
framework, but I do not think I would care. The conditions for valuing the event would not 
obtain and thus would not satisfy all of my conditions for regret.  
Moreover, if this seemingly innocuous event does cause pain because it matters to the agent, 
then ipso facto this is not innocuous from the agent’s perspective. Let us take the example of 
accidentally putting salt in my grandmother’s tea. This one-off event may be innocuous to my 
brother. He is normally thoughtful and patient in his affairs and it was accidental, in virtue of his 
character, that he put salt in the tea. He would have no cause for regret – such mistakes are truly 
foreign to him. I, on the other hand, do not share his virtues of thoughtfulness and patience. 
Unfortunately, I am usually rash and impatient in my affairs, and have been since childhood. 
When this one-off event of putting salt in the tea happens to me, I see it as a manifestation of my 
vices. I now view this “innocuous” past event as being an essential part of my character because 
it was an expression of my rashness and impatience which I regret. Even with seemingly 
innocuous events, it matters whether or not they are expressions of something with which the 
agent identifies.   
At this point, it can be argued that my account has a problematic implication. That only 
expressions of one’s character are subject to my regret and those that fall outside of what one 
would characteristically do are not subject to regret. This would be a weakness for my view 
because many actions I regret are ones that do not reflect who I think I am. It is precisely because 
an action is out of character that I regret doing it. However, this is only an apparent problem 
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because regret can be understood as falling on a continuum. Those actions for which I identify 
would rank higher on the continuum and would be strongly felt because of how I see their 
connection with my current normative/moral identity. Other actions that fall outside of my 
characteristic behavior would be regretful but in a lesser sense. Actions that I take but 
nevertheless are completely beyond my character and even my volition (e.g. committing a crime 
while sleepwalking) would not rank at all on the regretful continuum. My account allows for this 
gradation of regret and attendant pain.  
Second, in response to the objection that our prior misdeeds shape all of who we are and as a 
result undermine our current self-alienating perspective, I do not think this is always the case. 
That is, I do not think that it is inconsistent to view our prior misdeeds as foreign although they 
may be (and probably are) a part of our current identity. This is because our actions and values 
can come apart. Our actions may affect our biographical and psychological histories, but our 
normative perspective seems resistant to actions in ways that other aspects of our identities are 
not. I can view prior misdeeds as foreign if they do not reflect my current normative 
considerations. These misdeeds do not impact what I should think (i.e. my normative 
considerations), although they might impact what I do think or cannot prevent from thinking (i.e. 
my psychological predispositions).  
For example, let us say that a soldier acted cowardly in the past and is now predisposed to 
feel cowardice on the battlefield. He currently feels afraid when he should not and knows this is 
blameworthy. In this way, his prior actions have made him who he is today. He is a coward. 
However, from his current normative viewpoint, he values courage. And although he regrets his 
past choices which have made him who he is today (psychologically), he still sees himself 
(normatively) as courageous and it pains him when he realizes he is not. In this sense, he feels 
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self-alienation. So although the soldier is cowardly and his psychological reality is consistent 
with this, he values courage and the recognition of this grounds his alienation.  
III. Different Views of Regret 
There are various ways to understand the phenomenon of regret and numerous accounts 
have been suggested in the literature. Although these accounts do not always fit nicely into 
categories, I will use a tripartite categorization scheme to highlight what I see as the distinctive 
feature of each account. This is not an exhaustive taxonomy. My goal is to provide an 
interpretive framework from which to analyze different accounts of regret in a way that brings 
out what is important for this discussion. What is important is how the following accounts treat 
both what it means for the agent to evaluate a past event (i.e. evaluative judgment) and why he 
cares about the results of that evaluation (i.e. valuation). This specific goal precludes other 
interesting but unhelpful ways of categorizing regretful episodes, such as, psycho-somatic 
descriptions, affective intensity, dispositional/occurrent characteristics, rational/irrational 
expressions, and many others. 
A. Regret-as-feeling 
The three categories are: regret-as-feeling, regret-as-counterfactual and regret-as-loss. Let 
us start with regret understood as a feeling.19 In characterizing regret as a feeling, I am not 
claiming that other views of regret lack an affective component. Rather, I am distinguishing the 
relative importance of the affective component on some accounts. There are two types of regret-
as-feeling accounts. One that treats regret as an expression of how one feels, i.e. emotions just 
are the feelings. For example, in the Principles of Psychology, William James states that “bodily 
changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same 
                                                          
19 Emotions understood as merely taking stock of our feelings, passions and other internal happenings has a long 
tradition, including Rene Descartes, David Hume, William James, and others. See: William Lyons. Emotion. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
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changes as they occur is the emotion.”20 Regret, on this view, is perceiving the regretful event 
(i.e. the historical judgment) and noticing how our bodies react to it. Another regret-as-feeling 
view does not equate regret with feeling. Instead, this view has the advantage of having both a 
historical and evaluative component, in addition to the feeling. However, the feeling of regret is 
contingent and does not appear to follow from the evaluation. Ultimately, it is for this reason this 
view is untenable. This latter view will now be our focus.21  
In “Is it Reasonable to Regret?” Rudiger Bittner calls regret as “a painful feeling one has 
when one does a bad thing.”22 Bittner’s project is not to define regret. However, in attempting to 
show that regret is unreasonable, he lays out what a regretful episode would be.23 The reasonable 
person who does not regret (i.e. who is not pained by the past deed), he states, “understands what 
he did, he knows that it was bad, it just does not pain him.” Does this person experience regret 
anyway? It is unclear. Bittner’s view could be that regret is only cognitive and evaluative. One 
recognizes the action one took in the past and evaluates it from one’s current normative 
framework. If one is dissatisfied with the result of this process, one regrets it. The question, “do 
you regret that decision? [e.g. to buy a car] is a question that requires me to think, and to think 
practically, about the decision, and not merely to inspect my feelings.”24 Or he could mean that 
one does not regret, although one carries out the proper cognitive and evaluative processes, 
because a necessary condition of regret is to be pained. It is as though the regret resides in the 
                                                          
20 William James, Principles of Psychology, as quoted in Lyons (1980), 13.  
21 The former view of regret has no evaluative component. For this reason, it is open to serious criticism and is less 
plausible as an emotional theory than the latter view. See: Lyons. Emotion. 
22 Rudigar Bittner in “Is it Reasonable to Regret?” in Reason, Emotion and Will by R. Jay Wallace (1999). 
23 He states, “The object of the following is not to demarcate what it is to regret things one did, to describe how it 
feels, or to state the precise conditions under which regret does and does not appear,” in Bittner, ibid. 262.  
24 Stuart Hampshire. Thought and Action. (New York: Viking Press, 1967), 241. 
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feeling and if we can remove the bad feeling, we can remove the regret.25 The feeling, in other 
words, is contingent and can be detached from the evaluation.26  
If he means the latter (which I think he does), how are we to understand the evaluation 
involved? If one evaluates an event and is not pained by it, then it seems as though this 
evaluation is not about something one values. For example, accidentally veering into another 
lane would presumably cause distress to the drivers next to me. And, though I admit it was bad, I 
do not feel too bad about it. This is because I am not concerned. Accidentally veering into 
another lane is not normatively salient to me in the way that, say, unintentionally hurting 
someone close to me with an insensitive comment would be. Bittner’s account seems to treat 
things we care about and things we do not care about as having a similar emotional valence. But 
this is questionable. It is from unimportant things that we can detach our feelings – it is they that 
have little or no emotional importance.  
Perhaps the reason we feel bad in the first place is that we care about how we went 
wrong. It is the necessary connection of caring and feeling that Bittner appears to 
underappreciate. To disvalue something is to have feelings and desires about it. When we 
evaluate a past action that matters to us, our feelings are essentially connected to this experience. 
There is no other way to experience it.27 Such detachments (as he advocates) can only occur in 
contexts that do not have normative significance, and in cases like this it is unclear why a 
negative emotion would be generated at all. That is, these cases are not the right sort of cases for 
which regret is appropriate.28    
                                                          
25 There are others who also agree with the detachment of the regretful feeling from the cognitive and evaluative 
processes, but maintain that regret exists without it. For example, Bedford (1956) states “I never feel the slightest 
pang of regret for what I did” (italics mine). I understand Bedford as recognizing and evaluating a mistake but not 
feeling bad about it.  
26 Presumably, after this detachment occurs, we no longer have regret. 
27 See Hieronymi (2007) and Watson (1975). 
28 I examine this is detail in Chapter 3.  
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B. Regret-as-counterfactual 
By far, the most popular view of regret is one that wishes things had been otherwise or that 
one had acted differently.29 Hence, Bernard Williams, Marcia Baron, Julie Tannenbaum, and 
Benjamin Matheson, think that “the constitutive thought of regret…is something like ‘how much 
better if it had been otherwise.’” 30 Carla Bagnoli considers regret to be “a kind of counterfactual 
reasoning, a thought experiment about what might have been instead.”31 R. Jay Wallace believes 
that to regret is to have a “preference that the thing one regrets should have been otherwise.”32 
Janet Landman states that regret “is associated with counterfactual thought, or imagining states 
contrary to fact.”33 And, economist Robert Sugden characterizes regret as “a painful sensation of 
recognizing that ‘what is’ compares unfavorably with ‘what might have been.’”34 
On the regret-as-counterfactual view, an agent judges his past action to be bad because it led 
to a state of affairs that he currently finds objectionable and now wishes for a different state of 
affairs or wishes that he had made a different choice. We can take as the standard view Bernard 
Williams’ version: “The constitutive thought of regret in general is something like ‘how much 
better if it had been otherwise,’ and the feeling can in principle apply to anything of which one 
can form some conception of how it might have been otherwise.”35 
                                                          
29 In addition to the following accounts of the counterfactual view, see Hoerl and McCormack (2016) and Samuel 
Johnson, “No. 47. The Proper Means of Regulating Sorrow.” I take sorrow to function similar to regret in the latter 
article.  
30 See Williams, Moral Luck, Marcia Baron, “Remorse and Agent-Regret,” (1988), Julie Tannenbaum, “Emotional 
Expressions of Moral Value,” (2006), Benjamin Matheson, “More Than a Feeling: The Communicative Function of 
Regret” (2017).  
31 Carla Bagnoli. "Rooted in the Past, Hooked in the Present: Vulnerability to Contingency and Immunity to Regret." 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92, no. 3 (2016): 763-70.  
32 R. Jay Wallace, The View From Here: On Attachment, Assessment and the Limits of Regret. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013): 69. 
33 Janet Landman, Regret: The Persistence of the Possible. New York: Oxford University Press, (1993): 37. 
34 Robert Sugden. "Regret, Recrimination and Rationality." Theory and Decision 19, no. 1 (1985): 79. 
35 Williams, Moral Luck. 
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This standard view of regret-as-counterfactual is too broad. Applying the concept of regret to 
anything “of which one can form some conception of how it might have been otherwise” seems 
to allow too many other descriptions for the same phenomenon. As stated above, a range of 
mental states from sorrow to aesthetic dissatisfaction can be subsumed under this description. 
Moreover, it is unclear what activates the agent’s valuation. Once an agent judges that a given 
state of affairs would be better otherwise, we are still unsure why he would care. There are many 
events in the world for which I can evaluate as suboptimal, but not care enough to be pained by 
it.  
A more robust view is one by R. Jay Wallace. For him, regret is the thought that:   
It would have been better had things been otherwise in the past, because and insofar as the actual state of affairs 
that obtained involved a misfortune or a setback or a harm for something that one is attached to (an individual 
or project or ideal). This kind of effect is one that is normatively significant for the person who is so attached, 
giving that person (but not necessarily other persons) a reason for the complex of responses that are constitutive 
of regret.36  
This view seems able to explain not only the content of the evaluation when one regrets (i.e. 
something is judged to be a misfortune or setback or harm) but also why one should care about it 
(i.e. it is significant with respect to one’s attachments). This version of the regret-as-
counterfactual view seems able to handle the shortcomings of the first version. However, there 
are still two other problems for which it must deal.  
First, and this is particular to Wallace’s account, his view of regret ultimately leads to an 
unacceptable conclusion. On Wallace’s account, if we value someone or something in the 
present, then we are committed to affirming all of its necessary antecedents. If I like something 
now, I am committed to liking or at least affirming all of the things responsible for its existence. 
To put it differently, if I love my spouse and discover that her parents met in the US after having 
fled Nazi Germany, I cannot regret and must affirm the Nazis or the problems they caused during 
                                                          
36 Wallace, The View From Here, 49. 
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the war. This is because they were a necessary causal factor responsible for the parents’ meeting 
in the US, and without this meeting my spouse would not have been born.37  
Wallace is able to reach this conclusion from his understanding of affirmation. But, his 
understanding of affirmation is defined with respect to regret. So, it starts with regret. I will 
explain how he arrives at his unacceptable conclusion, then how I think it can be blocked. His 
views of regret and affirmation are: 
Regret: To experience all-in regret is to have an on-balance preference that the thing one 
regrets should have been otherwise.  
Affirm: To prefer on balance that it should have been just as it was.  
These are contrary attitudes that cannot be combined.38 
(All-in) regret and (on balance) affirmation cannot be applied to the same phenomenon. This is 
straightforward: if I (on balance) affirm my dissertation topic, I cannot (all-in) regret it. The 
reason for the “on balance” and “all-in” is that it allows for cases where there might be 
particulars of a project that I regret, although overall I affirm it. Simply put, once everything is 
accounted for, I cannot both regret and affirm the same thing in the same respect.   
Wallace also tells us that affirmations are “intention-like attitudes“ because “to take an 
affirmative attitude toward a person or situation is to ‘will’ that the person should exist or the 
situation should have obtained.”39 It is also intention-like because affirmation is “a kind of 
achievement” that we can choose to apply to difficult situations which may not be easy to affirm. 
One implication for affirming something is that we must also affirm the necessary or 
constitutive conditions that make it possible. This principle is the “affirmation dynamic.” 
                                                          
37 His view seems to be this strong, as he states himself. See footnote 43.  
38 Wallace, 69. 
39 Wallace, 66. 
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Affirmation dynamic: If we are attached to an individual or to a project, then we will typically affirm the 
direct objects of our affirmation…this in turn commits us to affirming their necessary constitutive and 
historical and normative conditions…and precludes our regretting that those conditions obtained.40 
Wallace appears not to provide a reason why we have to accept all of the antecedent necessary 
conditions for the object of our affirmation.41 One may agree that to affirm something is to will it 
to exist, but reject the claim that we have to accept an indefinite chain of, perhaps, unacceptable 
prior events.  
One commentator supplies a plausible explanation. Niko Kolodny believes that the 
principle of instrumental rationality justifies this move given the intention-like character of 
affirmation. He states: 
Roughly, if one intends an end, then one is “committed,” as a matter of instrumental rationality, to 
intending the necessary means to it. For example, if I intend to smoke another cigarette, then I am 
committed to lighting another up.42 
Therefore, on pain of being irrational, we are committed to intending or willing the events or 
people that produced what we currently affirm, even if they are historical atrocities.43 
However, I think this grim conclusion can be blocked with a different understanding of 
regret. Regret, instead, can be viewed as a loss or lack of power to make a meaningful choice. On 
the one hand, given this understanding, it seems as though the contrary to regret is something 
like pride or self-satisfaction. One is proud in one’s agency to bring about a state of affairs. 
Affirmation becomes something other than an intention-like attitude. If so, it blocks the 
implication that we cannot regret the causal antecedents of what we currently affirm. Instead, we 
                                                          
40 Wallace, 77. 
41 It is also unclear why he considers the way things happened to turn out to be necessary instead of contingent. I 
presume that although my parents met a grocery store, they could have met at the gas station, if that grocery store 
did not exist. It is unclear that if the grocery store had not existed that my parents would never have met.  
42 Niko Kolodny. "Dynamics of Affirmation." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92, no. 3 (2016): 7. 
43 Wallace acknowledges this unacceptable consequence of his view: “We can … readily imagine that somewhere 
along the line, the actual ancestors of those we love would not even have encountered each other if not for historical 
events that were momentously disastrous: a catastrophic and pointless war, for instance, that forced a distant 
progenitor into the refugee camp where she met her future husband, or a natural calamity of some kind that had a 
similar effect. Under these conditions, our unconditional affirmation of the person we love will commit us to 
affirming the objectionable historical conditions that were necessary for the individual person’s existence.” 
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can characterize affirmation in terms of being satisfied with one’s agency or being satisfied with 
having brought about a given state of affairs. On this view, there is no intention-like attitude, no 
preference being brought into existence and no transitivity from what one affirms to all of its 
antecedent conditions. For example, if one affirms one’s marriage, one is simply satisfied with 
one’s agency in bringing it about. This could be one’s decision to propose or one’s willingness to 
work through a particular marital difficulty. Any choice the agent made that contributed to what 
he currently affirms, in this case the marriage, could be the object of his satisfaction.  
Second, another shortcoming with the regret-as-counterfactual view is that it could 
mischaracterize how we actually view alternatives. If it were better that things were otherwise, 
then the current situation can be seen as regretful without qualification. That is, the current 
situation can be seen as all bad, and the alternative as all good. Values, then, are understood as 
being concentrated in one alternative and not in another. For example, I may not want to eat 
vegetable soup and wish things were otherwise – it would be better if I were eating apple pie 
instead. One could interpret this as having the value concentrated in one of the two options, 
namely, the apple pie, with no value at all in the soup. And if I were to get the apple pie, I would 
have no regret for the vegetable soup.  
Thomas Hurka calls the view where one option monopolizes all of the value the 
“concentration view.” In contrast, there is the “proportionality view” which distributes value 
among alternatives (if this represents more accurately where they belong). He states:  
The concentration view says that, having chosen between two goods, you should direct all your feeling to 
the one that is greater…[and] feel only and entirely pleased; if you did not, you should feel only regret. The 
proportionality view says you should divide your feelings in proportion to the goods' relative values: more 
for the greater good, but still some for the lesser good.44 
                                                          
44 Thomas Hurka. "Monism, Pluralism, and Rational Regret." Drawing Morals, (2011) 556.  
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It is the proportionality view that is most accurate for some choices. One may choose the highest 
value yet still desire what was given up. In the food example, although I think it is better to have 
the apple pie, I also may regret not having the soup. It is simply that I find more value in the pie 
than in the soup, not that the soup is without any value.45 It is the possibility that values can be 
distributed throughout the alternatives that the regret-as-counterfactual position 
underappreciates.  
The proponent of the counterfactual view could object that his view does take into 
account proportionality. One should choose between alternatives, all-things-considered. It is 
only when one looks at the complete value-profile of the choices – including the values in the 
options one considers forgoing – that one is in the position to think it is better that things are 
otherwise. And, this counterfactual view of regret acknowledges that a state of affairs is regretful 
all-things-considered. So it is accurate to make a judgment that one option is better than another, 
and that one would not regret the forgone option, because implicit in this judgment is that all 
things have been considered, i.e. the values and disvalues of the regretful and preferred options 
have been accounted for.   
However, there is a deeper problem concerning values even with this clarification. 
Comparing alternatives is only feasible when the values are commensurate. When values are 
incommensurate it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to choose the best of two options. For 
example, on what basis can we compare the pleasure of cycling with that of philosophy to an 
aficionado of both? There may not be a single commensurate criterion. In such cases, one can 
choose something all-things-considered, yet still desire the choices that were forgone because the 
values are of a different kind. If this is possible, then regret is more accurately described as 
                                                          
45 I am assuming that the value here is commensurate. It is something like units of culinary satisfaction, although 
trying to quantify this accurately is another matter.  
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missing out. And missing out is something one can feel although one does not want things to be 
otherwise. One can both regret and not think things would be better otherwise.  
In discussing his choice to be a philosopher instead of a poet or doctor, Kieran Setiya 
notices that his choice to be a philosopher has precluded other possible careers. And, although, 
all things considered, he is pleased with his choice, there is something tragic about missing out 
on the other careers: 
When push came to shove, I followed my muse, and applied to read philosophy…I don’t regret my 
decision. I don’t believe I would have lived a better life in poetry or medicine; most likely, worse. I have 
been very fortunate. I am very lucky to have a tenured position in philosophy…I am lucky to have 
wonderful colleagues and students...For in spite of everything, when I run the experiment, draw “doctor” or 
“poet” from the hat of personal history, trace a branch in the tree of possibilities now cut off, I feel a sense 
of loss that is not unlike regret. There are the poems I will never write, the lives I will not save. I see no 
path from where I am to those alternatives, no future in which I go to medical school or become a good 
enough poet…I look back with envy at my younger self, options open, choices not yet made. He could be 
anything. But I am condemned: course set, path fixed, doors closed.46 
Missing out, as Setiya notes, recognizes “that we cannot have everything we want, and what we 
have does not subsume or compensate for what we don’t [and] is a consequence of 
incommensurability.” This idea of missing out is not accommodated on the regret-as-
counterfactual view. It is because of this and the prior difficulties that make this perspective of 
regret problematic.  
C. Regret-as-loss   
As Setiya’s anecdote demonstrates, we can regret not getting all we value. We “miss out” on 
what is important to us and feel the pain of loss. And, for some commentators, this is how the 
agent sees regret. For example, referring to choosing judo over playing the violin, Stocker and 
O’Neill note, “I may choose judo because I see that…I now need physical development more 
than musical development. But I can none the less regret that I will miss out on the musical 
                                                          
46 Kieran Setiya. Midlife: A Philosophical Account. Princeton University Press, (2017): 56-57. 
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development.”47 Daniel Jacobson says that, “regret can mean an error or a loss.”48 Spinoza seems 
to suggest the same, “regret is…a pain…which arises from the absence of something we hate.”49 
As I later explain, the “absence” seems to be a loss. But what exactly does this loss consist of? It 
varies. On some accounts, the loss represents unrealized values in the options that are not chosen. 
On other accounts, the agent loses his ability to act in a way that is consistent with how he 
currently sees himself, i.e. with his self-image.50  
That regret can be viewed as a loss seems to have precedent in the works of Baruch Spinoza. 
In the Ethics, he states: 
Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something, kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and 
at the same time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it. 
Explanation.--When we remember a thing, we are…disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion 
[pleasure] as if it were something present; but this disposition…is generally checked by the images of 
things which exclude the existence of that which we remember.  
Wherefore regret is, strictly speaking, a pain opposed to that pleasure, which arises from the absence of 
something we hate (italics mine).51 
What I take Spinoza to be saying is that during an episode of regret we first have a pleasant 
thought of an object. This would normally bring with it pleasure. However, we quickly notice 
that the thought of the object cannot be realized due to countervailing circumstances – the object 
was in the distant past and those circumstances cannot be replicated. For example, suppose I 
remember how great my relationship was right before I did the wrong thing to end it. This 
thought brings with it pleasure – the relationship was a significant value to me. It also brings to 
mind the action that was responsible for the relationship’s irrevocable termination: my 
                                                          
47 Onora O’Neill and Michael Stocker. "Plural and Conflicting Values." The Philosophical Quarterly 41, no. 164 
(1991): 174. 
48 Jacobson acknowledges this but nevertheless believes that viewing regret as a loss is irrational. In “Regret, 
Agency and Error.” 
49 Spinoza in Ethics as found in: Benedictus De Spinoza and John Daniel Wild. Spinoza. Selections. Edited by John 
Wild. New York: C. Scribners Sons, 1930. 
50 This is the account that I developed earlier and will return to later in this chapter.  
51 Spinoza in Ethics, E3: DOE. 32 
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wrongheaded decision to end it. With this in mind, I imagine not having the relationship, which 
is painful.  
The problem, it seems, is a subtle one. I am not pained because I think about not having 
the relationship which resulted from my bad decision. Strictly speaking, I cannot think about a 
negation. Instead, Spinoza seems to suggest that I think about the good that I had, i.e. the 
relationship, and in relation to this I think about it not being there. I start with the existential 
thing, then imagine its removal. I do not think about the non-relationship on its own. And “the 
absence of something we hate” is the result of no longer entertaining the pleasurable thought 
because I realize it cannot be. It is the absence of my pleasurable thought that I hate. It is what 
pains me. While Spinoza neither explicitly identifies this pain as self-alienation nor makes 
reference to the agent’s current impotence over his prior choices, he does seem to characterize 
regret as an absence or loss that is associated with feeling regret.52  
But, this is still unclear. We still need to know how to fit loss into a framework of regret. 
From what we have seen, first-personal regret seems to arise from two circumstances. The first is 
when an agent makes an error. This is the intuition that seems to be at the heart of the regret-as-
feeling and regret-as-counterfactual views. Presumably, one would not regret had one acted 
differently by avoiding the error. The second pertains to a loss. These two categories – error and 
loss – seem difficult to sort out.  
One way to conceptualize this distinction is to view both error and loss as species of 
regret where both are mutually exclusive. When one errs, one regrets what is done because it 
goes against one’s current normative values and another state of affairs is perceived to be better. 
When one loses or misses out on a value, it too is regrettable.  
                                                          
52 “Self-alienation” does not appear to have been in wide circulation in the mid-17th century during the time of 
Spinoza, although there is record of it being used in 1648 by W. Montagu in Miscellanea Spiritualia. See: "self-
alienation, n." OED Online. March 2019. Oxford University Press.  
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Here is the structure graphically: 
                                                            Regret 
 
                                         
Error/ mistake                     Loss 
This structure of regret seems unsatisfactory. Daniel Jacobson, in “Regret, Agency and 
Error,” presents this picture of regret.53 On the one hand, we have errors which concern our 
decisions about what action to take. He argues that regretting our errors, which is the direct result 
of our agency, is rationally defensible. On the other hand, regretting our losses, which for him 
means “missing out,” is not a result of a decision we make. One can make correct or incorrect 
decisions and still miss out on something desirable. Loss involves outcomes and regretting these 
is not rationally defensible  
One reason for this is that there is no rational way to differentiate losses that are trivial 
from those that are significant. Take these two scenarios: 1.) Having to choose between pursuing 
a career and pursuing a romantic relationship. Both cannot be fulfilled and either choice requires 
giving up an important value. 2.) Having to choose between being on time to a daughter’s 
wedding and listening to another song in the car. As both cannot be fulfilled, the agent chooses 
the more important value of being on time at the wedding. But, in this case, the agent regrets not 
hearing the song. There is definitely something wrong with person in scenario 2. The problem is 
trying to identify what it is. Jacobson notes: 
                                                          
53 Daniel Jacobson. “Regret, Agency, and Error.” In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. vol. 1. edited by 
David Shoemaker (2013): 97. 
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To be seriously dismayed over genuine losses of value is compatible with being an admirable person facing 
an uncooperative world that demands sacrifice; whereas to be dismayed over not getting everything you 
want, though a recognizably human tendency, falls into the sphere of vice. As Stocker has aptly put the 
point: it makes you a whiner.54 
The idea seems to be that values are not quantifiable and so there is no basis for judging with 
accuracy why listening to another song (and no doubt receiving aesthetic pleasure) is less 
valuable than going to the wedding. The only basis for adjudicating between the two is aretaic, 
i.e. relating to what a virtuous person would do. And, on this basis, we can see that a virtuous 
person would attend the wedding with satisfaction, and a vicious one would whine about not 
hearing the song.55  
On a different interpretation of the structure of regret, we do not fall into the same 
problems. As we discussed, the problems were 1.) the separation of agency (which was located 
in error) from loss (which was found in outcomes), and 2.) loss was understood as “missing out” 
and this is not amenable to a rational justification. The first correction is that the relationship 
between losses and errors is not one of species to species, as it was above. Instead, it is one of 
genus to species – errors are a type of loss.  
When we fail to act correctly we lose the opportunity to act as we now think we should. 
And, on my view, it is this loss that pains us because we are aware of our failure to become the 
person we want to be. So it is misleading to separate loss from error because every error is a way 
in which we lose the opportunity to act. For this reason, error should be one category under loss. 
This category is further divided into moral and non-moral errors. 
                                                          
54 Jacobson, “Regret, Agency and Error,” 122. 
55 It is a further question why the virtuous person would act this way. The grounds that justify the virtuous person 
are beyond the ken of this chapter.   
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The second correction is that “missing out” is also a type of loss and represents a second 
category. There is not only one type of loss as the prior model presumed. Since this feeling is not 
as tightly connected with one’s agency as error, and since this seems to be grounded on aretaic 
instead of rational grounds, it is represented with a dotted line in the diagram below.   
The new structure would resemble this instead: 
    Regret 56 
   Loss 
 
 
Error (Alienation)                         Missing Out 
 
                         
      Moral                    Non-moral                                       Aretaic             
 
For these reasons, describing regret fundamentally in terms of a loss appears to be better 
at accommodating our first-personal, normative regret. The feeling view underexplains the 
regretful action – there is no explanation of why regretful acts matter. The view that describes 
regret as a counterfactual thought was also found to be deficient. Wallace’s interpretation had an 
unacceptable implication. Other interpretations, which might also apply to Wallace’s, fail to 
accommodate the incommensurability of values inherent in alternatives. We also found Spinoza 
and Jacobson’s characterization of loss insufficient. In the latter case, this was partly the result of 
                                                          
56 Alienation occurs at both the moral and non-moral components. Alienation with respect to non-moral regret seems 
to be possible, e.g. in sports or games. The idea is that one did not perform as well as one now thinks one should 
have. The normative assessment is not from the current agent qua moral being. Instead, it is from the current agent 
qua calculating/ performance-maximizing being. 
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how regret was structured. The new structure situates loss as the fundamental genus with 
different ways regret can be instantiated. And, for these reasons, it is an improvement on the old 
model.   
IV. Conclusion  
I have tried to provide a characterization of regret that accounts for the cognition, 
evaluation and valuation that occur in a regretful episode. My discussion paid special attention to 
the evaluation and valuation components and I tried to explicate my account in a way to avoid 
possible misinterpretations. Specifically, a first-personal, normative regretful action represents a 
loss or lack of power to change the fact that one acted badly, from one’s current values. It is 
neither merely a painful feeling nor a wish for a different state of affairs. Once the specific 
evaluative conditions obtain, our disposition to feel pain is realized. This dispositional regret 
allows for someone to have regret over long periods of time without feeling pained every 
moment in the interim. The pain represents a type of self-alienation. I believe this account is 
robust enough to handle the types of value that I later attribute to regret.  
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Chapter 3: Personal Values of Regret 
I. Introduction  
In the prior chapter, we considered arguments against the value of regret. Regret was to 
be disvalued on the basis of its impracticality, inappropriateness and unpleasantness.1 I attempted 
to show that these claims were unconvincing and suggested reasons in favor of regret’s value. 
However, reasons in favor were only suggested. I present a more complete case for regret’s value 
in this and the following chapters. In this chapter, I discuss the value of recognition and 
recognitional-learning. Briefly, what I call “recognition” is the process of focusing one’s 
attention on the contents of one’s regret. The agent is recognizing the values and reasons on 
which he failed to act. This process leads to clarity about the regretful experience because it is a 
way to get at the truth. Recognitional-learning is using recognition in order to improve one’s 
decision-making abilities in the future. The Aristotelian view is that we can habituate the process 
of optimizing our decision-making, and eventually become virtuous decision makers.2 
After discussing these values, I respond to potential objections. First, in response to the 
claim that recognition is a value of regret, Rudigar Bittner argues that we can have the value of 
recognition without the pain of regret. I respond that the pain of regret is a necessary feature of 
recognition and thus cannot be separated. Second, in response to both recognition and 
recognitional-learning, some may argue that my account of regret is compatible with agent-
regret. Agent-regret, however, does not permit the values of recognition and recognitional-
learning. This suggests that some forms of regret do not have the values I claim. Against this, I 
                                                          
1 Rudigar Bittner in "Is It Reasonable to Regret Things One Did?" The Journal of Philosophy 89, no. 5 (1992) 
argues for regret’s impracticality. Paddy McQueen in "When Should We Regret?" International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 25, no. 5 (2017) argues that regret is inappropriate in certain contexts. Bittner, and others, also 
agree that regret is bad.  
2 The virtue concerned with deliberation about prudential matters is prudence. See section 1142a25-32 in: Aristotle, 
and Terence Irwin. Nicomachean Ethics. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub., 1985. 
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argue that agent-regret does share some similarities with my view of regret and insofar as this is 
accurate the values of recognition and recognitional-learning obtain. However, I also show that 
the full values of regret cannot be realized in agent-regret because the agent is not blameworthy 
according to his normative standards. Finally, I provide a few closing remarks.  
II. Achilleus Regrets His Decision  
I begin with a short vignette of a well-known event, then discuss recognition and 
recognitional-learning in reference to it.  
From the Iliad: 
Agamemnon:  
I care nothing about you. I take no account of your anger. But here is my threat to you. Even as 
Phoibos Apollo is taking away my Chryseis. I shall…take the fair-cheeked Briseis, your prize, I 
myself going to your shelter, that you many learn well how much greater I am than you…3 
Achilleus: 
But I will tell you this and swear a great oath upon it: …some day longing for Achilleus will come 
to the sons of the Achaians, all of them. Then stricken at heart though you be, you will be able to 
do nothing, when in their numbers before man-slaughtering Hektor they drop and die. And then 
you will eat out the heart within you in sorrow, that you did no honor to the best of the 
Achaians…give me no more commands, since I for my part have no intention to obey you.4 
 
Here, Achilleus decides to withdraw from the fighting after being dishonored by 
Agamemnon. What follows is the utter destruction of Achilleus’ fellow soldiers and, most 
important, of his dearest friend, Patroklos. Upon realizing that his excessive anger is ultimately 
responsible for the death of his companion, he confesses to his mother and agonizes over his 
decision. 
Thetis:  
Why then, child, do you lament? What sorrow has come to your heart now? Speak out, do not hide 
it.  
Achilleus:  
My mother, all these things the Olympian brought to accomplishment. But what pleasure is this to 
me, since my dear companion has perished. Patroklos, whom I loved beyond all other 
companions, as well as my own life…the spirit within me does not drive me to go on living and be 
among men…since I was not to stand by my companion when he was killed. And now…he has 
                                                          
3 Homer, and Richmond Lattimore. The Iliad; Translated with an Introduction by Richmond Lattimore. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press (1951) 64. 
4 Homer, 66-67. 
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perished, and lacked my fighting strength to defend him…why, I wish that strife would vanish 
away from among gods and mortals, and gall, which makes a man grow angry for all his great 
mind, that gall of anger that swarms like smoke inside of a man’s heart and becomes a thing 
sweeter to him by far than the dripping of honey.5 
 
I take this to be a paradigmatic type of regret (although extreme in intensity). We have an 
agent pained from a prior choice, unable to choose differently and has to live with the 
consequences. Moreover, when he thinks back to the regretful decision it causes pain – pain 
seems to be a necessary condition when he thinks back to his role in causing his friend’s death. I 
will return to this example throughout the chapter as a reference to highlight characteristics of 
regret and its value.  
III. The Value of Recognition  
Although Achilleus is distraught by the fact that he cannot amend his regretful choice, 
there is still value in his painful recognition. In the heat of his emotionally induced realization 
that he is responsible for his friend’s death, Achilleus discovers something valuable. He is 
understanding the truth of his past actions – his decision to withdraw from the battle was wrong 
(according to his current values), it caused the loss of an important value and he no longer 
identifies with what his former self did, i.e. the person who made the choice has violated values 
that the person now holds dear. Achilleus now recognizes the values or reasons for which he 
failed to act. He sees that he should have been moved by his current reasons. In the process of 
recognition, he is more articulate about what the reasons are and why they are important.  
The mechanism that Achilleus uses to gain access to these facts is what I call 
“recognition.” Recognition is attending to both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of the 
regretful episode. The cognitive aspects include those features of the regretful episode open to 
analysis. Both identifying the facts and evaluating whether or not they are significant fall under 
                                                          
5 Homer, 377-378. 
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this category. Remembering what happened, under what conditions the choice was made and 
whether or to what degree one has transgressed a normative principle are typical types of 
cognitive performances. The purpose of this type of recognition is to achieve intellectual clarity. 
The agent is better acquainted with the truth and his grasp of the facts is more secure.  
The non-cognitive aspects are those features that are not open to analysis in the same way 
but need to be accepted on a sub-rational level. At this point in the recognition process, there is 
no more analysis to be performed – the facts are known, but they are difficult to accept. 
However, the agent must accept these facts because this is the person he has become. What is 
needed at this point is reconciliation, self-reconciliation – he needs to reestablish a sense of 
intrapersonal harmony.6   
The process would look something like this: when looking back on one’s behavior, one 
sees a track record of moral successes and failures. This is a record, in some sense, of one’s 
current moral worth. In the event that one’s moral worth on balance is unsatisfactory, it causes 
intrapersonal strife. The agent might say to himself, “This is not the person I am” or “I can’t live 
like this anymore,” both of which express self-alienation. However, this is a special kind of 
alienation. It is not being alienated from society or feeling alienated in a deep metaphysical way, 
say, from not feeling at peace with the world or with one’s body. In the paradigmatic case, one 
has let oneself down and feels bad because of it. It is this type of alienation that needs to be 
reconciled. The agent needs to reconcile himself to the fact that he has let himself down, which is 
especially troubling because not letting himself down can be seen as his primary responsibility.7  
                                                          
6 The definition of reconciliation captures this self-acceptance of oneself through the concept of harmony. 
Reconciliation: restoring to friendship or harmony.” "Reconcile." Merriam-Webster. Accessed March 10, 2019. 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reconcile.  
7 If this is not one’s primary responsibility I presume it would rank somewhere near the top.   
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It is worth noting that during the moral reckoning process when the agent is taking stock 
of his prior actions he can also come across exonerating facts which would liberate him from 
self-blame. He would not regard himself as blameworthy in the same way and would accept what 
he did and who he is.8 This is because he realizes that he has not let himself down after all. It is 
important to note that both clarity and self-acceptance are values that have a backward-looking 
focus. They are backward-looking because one gains clarity about a past event and self-
acceptance involves reconciling oneself to prior choices. 
One technique that facilitates the type of mental focus required for recognition is 
mindfulness.9 Mindfulness has gained popularity in recent years and can be described as “a 
process of bringing a certain quality of attention to moment-by-moment experience.”10 It is based 
on traditional Buddhist meditation and shares many of its meditative techniques. These 
techniques have shown to help overcome emotional and psychological distress by allowing 
subjects to access past events and emotions that are generally inaccessible.11 Attention and 
awareness are two types of mental focus that facilitate this access. Attention is the ability to 
concentrate on discrete “ever changing [factors] of consciousness” and awareness is “a stable 
specific state of consciousness.”12 
Given this distinction, the type of mental focus used to engage regretful decisions is 
closer to attention than awareness. Focusing on the relevant facts requires the ability to 
concentrate on discrete mental phenomena. The causal sequence of events, which features are 
                                                          
8 Exonerating facts would include different forms of acting in ignorance. 
9 Self-reflection has a long-standing philosophical precedent which could be another mode of recognizing one’s past 
actions. Mindfulness is one of many means to achieve recognition.  
10 As quoted from S. R. Bishop. "Mindfulness: A Proposed Operational Definition." Clinical Psychology: Science 
and Practice 11, no. 3 (2004): 230.  
11 Mindfulness in contemporary psychology has been adopted as an approach for increasing awareness and 
responding skillfully to mental processes that contribute to emotional distress and maladaptive behavior. Bishop, 
“Mindfulness: A Proposed Operational Definition.”  
12 Bishop, “Mindfulness: A Proposed Operational Definition,”and Lobsang Rapgay and Alexander Bystrisky. 
"Classical Mindfulness." Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1172, no. 1 (2009): 148-62.  
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most salient, which should be most salient, etc. all involve specific acts of mental differentiation 
and integration. On the other hand, reconciliation might involve awareness because managing 
one’s emotional state might involve a stable form of awareness. Meditative practices of 
mindfulness might be necessary to put one into a state of emotional accessibility, especially 
when these emotions are uncomfortable to face.13  
Recognition also has a non-backward looking focus. First, one can think about what is 
important about the action or value one failed to have. At this point, one is not planning anything 
about the future. One is simply recognizing the value of (e.g.) friendship or justice without any 
temporal restrictions. That is to say, one is thinking about values without reference to past, 
present or future. Although engaging in atemporal reflection, one is likely becoming more 
sensitive to recognizing these values in the future. In addition, recognition seems to have a 
forward-looking focus because the benefit can be prospective and can affect how we see future 
scenarios. The clarity acquired from a regretful event can be applied to normatively valent 
scenarios in the future. These scenarios are accessed through mental time travel which is “the 
faculty that allows humans to mentally project themselves backwards in time to re-live or 
forwards to pre-live, events.”14 It is through this imaginative projection that we gain a 
perspective on future scenarios that resemble similar ones in the past. It is a comparison of one to 
the other. This capacity for recognizing a potential regretful scenario is enhanced through the 
clarity of recognition.15 
                                                          
13 The difficulty of accessing uncomfortable emotions could conceivably be overcome with medication, therapy or 
other means.  
14 Thomas Suddendorf and Michael C. Corballis. "The Evolution of Foresight: What Is Mental Time Travel, and Is 
It Unique to Humans?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30, no. 3 (2007): 299. 
15 It is important to note that recognizing what happened in one’s past or recognizing that scenario in the future is 
not necessarily a process of learning something new. What may feel like learning something new could be a re-
acquiring of what was known at a prior time. A fact that was previously grasped but over time has diminished. The 
reacquisition of this fact and the clarity it provides is not learning something new although it may feel similar. This 
is distinct from recognitional-learning.  
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In our above example, Achilles derives value from the process of recognizing his 
mistake. Through mindfulness’ meditative techniques he is able to attend to the contents of his 
regret. His attention is now on Agamemnon’s remarks, how he felt at the moment and what his 
deliberative process entailed. This process gives him the clarity he now feels which is one step 
closer to reconciling himself with that dreadful choice. This clarity has also sharpened his moral 
awareness so that from now on Achilles will recognize situations in which his honor and 
reputation are undermined as potential traps that might lead to regret if he allows his emotions to 
distort his judgment. 
Although recognition appears to be a legitimate value of regret, it can be denied on the 
grounds that regret is an unnecessary component. In question form, the objection is: Cannot one 
recognize a wrongdoing and reap the benefits without feeling regret? Rudigar Bittner in “Is it 
Reasonable to Regret?” answers in the affirmative.16 He believes it is possible and even 
preferable because “[w]e can simply understand what we did wrong without the painful feeling 
of regret.”17 It is an interesting question what Bittner means by regret.18 He seems to believe that 
regret is a contingent negative feeling. It is contingent because one can carry out the proper 
cognitive and evaluative processes without the attendant negative affect. If we want to 
understand what happened during a regretful occasion, then we should attend to the occasion 
without the bad feeling.  
                                                          
16 Bittner, “Is It Reasonable to Regret Things One Did?” 
17 ibid. 
18 I summarize his view in chapter 2.   
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Not only does Bittner argue that a negative feeling is unnecessary to the process (and any 
resultant values), but it also impairs the process (and any resultant values).19 One’s emotions can 
prevent one from grasping the facts: 
It is not evident that one could not see, in full clarity but without grief, what one did wrong. In fact, the 
contrary might be true: that with grief one could not see in full clarity what one did wrong. After all, to see 
such a thing is itself an achievement and, hurt, torn, and dejected by regret, we may not be capable of doing 
it. However this may be, the case for the necessity of regret for recognizing one’s failing has not been 
made.20 
Regret therefore is a moral liability. If moral clarity is a value, and if regret diminishes clarity, 
then regret is morally damaging. Moreover, the above italicized sentence sums up the skeptic’s 
challenge: the case has not been made for the necessary connection between regret and 
recognizing one’s mistake. It is to this challenge that I now turn. 
In one sense, Bittner identifies a valid concern. Our emotions can impair cognitive 
functioning. If we are generally less productive in cognitive tasks when we unnecessarily indulge 
our emotions, then he is right to worry about regret. After all, regretful experiences can inflict 
emotional trauma. The emotions which can guide our attention to what we value most become 
overactive in fits of passion. This distorts their normal function.21 Instead of directing our 
awareness to meaningful facts and attributing an appropriate amount of time we spend on those 
facts, heightened emotions can cause us to focus on irrelevancies for far too long. For example, if 
I were overly emotional, say, with respect to a mistaken divorce, my analysis of what happened 
and what can be improved would be clouded by regret. I might get bogged down with irrelevant 
                                                          
19 The resultant values among others are clarity, reconciliation and learning. On Bittner’s view, emotions can impair 
our access to the facts. The upshot is that if we cannot grasp the facts, we cannot derive value from knowing the 
facts.  
20 Bittner “Is It Reasonable to Regret Things One Did?” 272, italics mine.  
21 That passion distorts our judgment is so widely recognized as a social phenomenon that it has made it into the 
legal system. Crimes of passion are usually punished less severely than they would otherwise be, e.g. second degree 
vs. first degree murder.  
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factors. How my ex-spouse had the audacity to change the dog’s name tag or the color of his 
bowl without discussing it with me will appear more important than focusing on the deeper 
compatibility issues. Not only would my focus be misguided but the time spent agonizing over 
these trivial disagreements would be excessive and unproductive. Insofar as Bittner recognizes 
the dangers of excessive emotions, he is correct. However, Bittner seems to take the further step 
to claim that even appropriate levels of regretful emotion are harmful, thereby putting excessive 
and appropriate levels of emotion on a par, which is unwarranted.  
Our emotions have a normal productive function in guiding our attention. Since our past 
is filled with innumerable occasions for self-praise or blame, and since all of our faults both large 
and small cannot be addressed, there needs to be a mechanism for identifying and prioritizing the 
most important issues to us. It is this guiding function that allows us to pick out relevant issues. 
We are also guided in how articulate in cognitive terms we need to be about a particular event. 
For example, in some cases, one might simply be guided to the judgment that “x was wrong.” In 
other cases, one might need to be more articulate and specify why “x was wrong.” The difference 
would depend on the relative emotional importance of the events. If I were to fail to hold the 
door open for someone with her hands full, my regret would only prompt the judgment that “I 
made a mistake and should be more aware in the future.” However, if I fail to remember a 
significant family appointment, this would prompt not merely the judgment “I made a mistake 
and should be more aware in the future,” but also the further judgments “I should have known 
better,” “how does this keep happening?” and “I need to implement an appointment system to 
prevent this from happening again.” One could even go further in articulating why this is wrong 
if, say, it recurs a 20th time and causes a divorce. The judgment, in this case, might take the form 
of a treatise on the ethics of marital responsibility. The upshot is that the treatment of the event 
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corresponds to how much it emotionally resonates with the agent. Moreover, we also need a 
sufficient amount of emotion to keep us invested in the problem long enough to solve it. Instead 
of spending too much time on a trivial issue as with an overactive emotion, or spending too little 
time on a serious issue as with an underactive emotion, the appropriate amount of emotional 
valence determines the correct amount of time to spend on an issue with respect to how it ranks 
in our value system. This is why regret is necessary to recognize facts that are meaningful to us.  
Bittner’s objection also mischaracterizes how we attend to moral facts. When we 
perceive non-moral facts, we are able to perform numerous dispassionate mental operations. If 
Achilleus were to observe the construction of a chariot, he would be able to analyze how it was 
made. He would also be able to evaluate how well it was made by seeing it in a race or on the 
battlefield. And both of these functions could be performed without an occurrent affective 
response. Non-moral facts admit of this type of emotional distance.22 Moral facts do not. When 
an agent recognizes a moral fact, he is seeing the scenario (or aspects of it) as in some way 
relevant to his system of values.23 And when something is related to one’s value system, it is 
being valued or disvalued. This seems to follow necessarily. If we compare facts to a standard, 
those facts are interpreted in light of the standard – regardless of what that standard is. If I lift 
weights and have been using the same weight every day, this becomes my reference point, my 
standard. If I pick up a different weight, it is interpreted by me not as (e.g.) 50lbs, but as light or 
heavy with respect to my reference point. I can intellectually understand that it is 50lbs, but that 
is inseparable from feeling it as light or heavy (or I suppose “normal” if it matches my current 
                                                          
22 An agent can have both positive and negative affective responses when attending to non-moral facts. My claim is 
merely that this is not a necessary connection. 
23 This seems to have support in the neuroscience literature. For example, researchers found that when participants 
evaluated moral sentences the regions of the brain associated with emotional processing showed more activity than 
with non-moral sentences. “Moll, Eslinger, and Oliveira-Souza (2001). See also Christoph Klebl, Isabel Dziobek & 
Rhett Diessner (2019) “The role of elevation in moral judgment,” Journal of Moral Education. 
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weight). Relating objects or facts to a standard is valuing or disvaluing them. When one is 
recognizing moral facts, then one is morally valuing or disvaluing them.24  
In the case of Achilleus, when he performs the act of recognition, he immediately thinks 
of Agamemnon and withdrawing from the battle. This act is value-laden because of what these 
facts mean to him. These particular facts rank very highly in his value hierarchy – they are 
relevant to the death of his friend whom he misses. One cannot imagine a world where Achilleus 
thinks about this event – the genesis of his friend death – devoid of value, meaning or sadness. If 
he were able to detach himself so completely, it would call into question the value of his 
friendship. 
IV. The Value of Recognitional-learning 
More often than not our episodes of regret are chances for us to learn something about 
ourselves and to optimize our future behavior. In addition to the value in recognition, regret is 
valuable because it facilitates moral self-improvement. I call this type of value recognitional-
learning instead of merely learning because one needs to recognize the facts before one can learn 
from them. Thus, every act of learning on my account presupposes the value of recognition. In 
this section, I only focus on the value of learning but the value of recognition is implicit 
throughout. I present two arguments for the claim that regret is a means to moral improvement. 
The first argument relies on the psychological reality of how negative emotions disincentivize 
behavior. This is presented from an Aristotelian framework. The second argument is deduced 
from our earlier conclusions.   
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle devotes attention to the issue of moral education.25 
He is concerned with a certain type of moral education; specifically, he wants an account of how 
                                                          
24 My account is open to different accounts of moral value.  
25 Aristotle, and Terence Irwin. Nicomachean Ethics. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub., 1985.  
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to inculcate virtue. One’s character, involving psychological dispositional states, needs training. 
Knowing the right action and doing it are insufficient for virtuous behavior. One must also feel 
in the right way.26 Virtues are character traits which regulate both how to act and how to feel. 
This creates a minor puzzle. He states: 
Someone might be puzzled, however, about what we mean by saying that we become just by doing just 
actions and temperate by doing temperate actions. For [one might suppose that] if we do grammatical or 
musical actions, we are grammarians or musicians, and similarly, if we do just or temperate actions, we are 
thereby just or temperate.27  
The puzzle is that: a virtuous person is one who does the virtuous act virtuously. That is, the 
virtuous person does the virtuous act in conjunction with a virtuous disposition – both the 
internal state and external action must align. If someone needs to be taught virtue, it means they 
have not achieved a virtuous inner state. How is it possible then to teach someone to be virtuous 
by only teaching them what the virtuous person does, i.e. by only teaching them virtuous external 
actions? This will merely be a superficial performance which anyone can mimic. Clearly this is 
not enough. Virtuous actions need to be done from a stable and unchanging virtuous state. If one 
does not already have a virtuous state, it seems puzzling how one should acquire it.  
Aristotle’s response is that “the agent must also be in the right state when he does [the 
virtuous actions].” And he achieves this “by the frequent doing of just and temperate actions” for 
the right reasons.28 For Aristotle, repeating this behavior in the right way, at the right time, for 
the right reasons, etc. shapes one’s dispositional state, which allows one to feel and act uniformly 
in response to similar environmental conditions. The student who wants to be brave must 
practice what the brave man does until the student does a brave action bravely. This is relevant 
                                                          
26 As Aristotle states, referring to being good which is being dispositionally good, “the purpose of our examination 
is not to know what the virtue is, but to become good, since otherwise the inquiry would be of no benefit to us” (NE 
1103b28-32). 
27 Aristotle, NE 1105a17-21. 
28 Aristotle, NE 1105a31-35, NE 1105b5. 
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for our discussion of regret because pain has a role in how we practice. It is the pain of regret 
that helps to prevent the recurrence of behavior we disvalue. Since this pain is associated with a 
prior bad action (i.e. an action or decision that violated a value), and that bad action will be 
habitually avoided, then at least some of our potential future bad actions will have a deterrent. 
Over time when we are presented with similar enough circumstances to activate our dispositional 
responses, e.g. when facing death on the battlefield, our bad habits of running away will diminish 
and our disinclination toward bad actions will be habituated. This is partly due to the pleasure we 
take in fine actions and partly due to pain we experience from bad ones.29 What is noteworthy 
about the Aristotelian picture is that the pain and pleasure of moral habituation operates at the 
level of character traits and not solely, or perhaps predominately, at the level of rational 
processing. The Aristotelian method of habituation and various forms of behavioral modification 
are future-oriented benefits in the sense that they attempt to reconfigure our psycho-emotional 
states so that under the right conditions we will minimize erroneous action.  
In a similar way, regret functions as an aid to cognitive and imaginative self-
improvement. So far we have considered experiences of past pain that serve to disincentive 
future actions. The agent is morally underdeveloped and needs extensive moral training. But, is 
there any recourse to moral improvement when the agent is more or less aligned with her values? 
In this case, one might think regret would be unnecessary for self-improvement. After all, there 
is little to regret. Consider this scenario:  
Jane has consistently worked on self-improvement. Over the years, she has used regret to 
align her actions closer to her values. She is not in perfect alignment but she is 
approaching it. However, now she discovers another problem which she did not have 
previously. Since her actions are rising closer to her ideal, she is becoming vulnerable to 
                                                          
29 Howard Rachlin, "Altruism and Selfishness." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25, no. 2 (2002): 239-50. 
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more potentially regrettable actions. This is because the principles on which she acts were 
initially imprecise and permissive – there was more room for error while still acting 
within the principles’ purview. The boundaries could handle a range of deviation. But, as 
she continued acting within these fuzzy boundaries, she noticed that the actions closer to 
the boundaries caused regret. They are not as regretful as the actions clearly beyond it, 
but they are regretful nonetheless. Over time, the principles on which she acts become 
refined, the imprecise boundaries are reduced, i.e. the range of non-regretful behavior 
recedes, and she is left with a very precise principle and a small range of possible non-
regretful behavior open to her. To make this a bit more concrete, let us say that the 
principle on which she acts is: “be nice to friends.” Initially, she successfully applies this 
principle to 100 out 150 people she meets. This means that out of the 150 people she 
meets, she considers 100 of them friends and she is nice to them. However, she does not 
have a precise understanding of “friends” or “being nice.” So at this stage she rarely 
misses a potential friend to treat nicely. She treats far too many people nicely but given 
her imprecise understanding it is acceptable. However, as time passes, her definitions of 
“friends” and “being nice” become more precise and her principle more refined. She 
successfully applies this principle to 10 out of 150 people she meets. Although she has 
become more refined with her principle, the possibility of her missing a friend is greater. 
As she becomes better, the chance for error improves.  
Let us call this “the case of normative perfection.” What this case illustrates is the 
paradoxical nature of improving one’s ability to act in accordance with one’s principles. This is 
interesting because I think regret still has a role to play in this type of person. Not only is 
regretting useful for those with serious transgressions or for those with numerous less serious 
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ones, regret is also appropriate for those who are already nearing the virtuous ideal.30 Those who 
have little occasion for regret can still benefit from what can be called the virtue of self-scrutiny. 
Routinely auditing one’s actions and values ensures one is on normative track. Since deviations 
are always possible,31 and since self-delusion is a pervasive, omnipresent danger of the human 
condition, behavioral improvement requires this type of routine self-scrutiny. Critical self-
reflection is well known to the ancient Greeks and Romans. Here, Seneca describes approvingly 
the nightly routine of a stoic he admired, Sextius:  
When the day was spent and he had retired to his night’s rest, [Sextius] asked his mind, “Which of 
your ills did you heal today? Which vice did you resist? In what aspect are you better?” Your anger will 
cease and become more controllable if it knows that every day it must come before a judge. Is there 
anything finer, then, than this habit of scrutinizing the entire day? What sort of sleep follows this self-
examination—how peaceful, how deep and free, when the mind has been either praised or admonished, 
when the sentinel and secret censor of the self has conducted its inquiry into one’s character! I exercise this 
jurisdiction daily and plead my case before myself. When the light has been removed and my wife has 
fallen silent, aware of this habit that’s now mine, I examine my entire day and go back over what I’ve done 
and said, hiding nothing from myself, passing nothing by. For why should I fear any consequence from my 
mistakes, when I’m able to say, “See that you don’t do it again, but now I forgive you.”32 
This type of self-scrutiny is suitable for anyone, even for those more perfected in their actions. 
Regret seems to be related to self-scrutiny because it appears to be a necessary part of the 
process. One cannot take a balance of one’s actions and inactions if one has nothing to balance. 
There mere act of balancing presupposes having positives and negatives. The negatives, the 
deviations from one’s values, are regrets. Even if they are not fully-fledged regrets, they are 
actions which can be improved. Regret, then, even in people who are relatively virtuous, like 
Jane and Sextius, is useful because it is a constituent of self-scrutiny.  
                                                          
30 Since my account of regret is neutral to the content of one’s values, virtuous behavior is subject to the agent’s 
understanding.  
31 This is possible in everyone except the morally perfect or the completely virtuous person. Hence, the virtue of 
self-scrutiny will be an aid to everyone except them.  
32 Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Robert A. Kaster, Martha Craven Nussbaum. Anger, Mercy, Revenge. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, (2012): 91. 
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In some sense, one could argue that self-scrutiny is akin to Aristotelian prudence. 
Prudence for Aristotle is a governing virtue – it is the virtue that regulates and makes possible all 
of the other virtues of character. Prudence belongs to the rationally calculating part of the soul 
and we use its correct deliberation as a basis for correct action.33 Prudence is prescriptive 
because it guides action. This is relevant for our discussion because of how it relates to the 
virtues of character. Insofar as the different virtues of character are guides to action in their 
specific domain, they share a commonality. Each virtue brings with it a correct understanding of 
what should be done.34 The understanding of what to do in any circumstance is prudence. 
Aristotle states “the decision will not be correct without prudence or without virtue – for [virtue] 
makes us achieve the end, whereas [prudence] makes us achieve the things that promote the 
end.”35 Since virtues require prudential deliberation, prudence is involved every virtuous 
action.36 
This relationship between prudence and virtues seems similar to that of self-scrutiny and 
regret. Self-scrutiny is a higher level activity than regret because the self-scrutinizing process 
identifies our errors and successes. Moreover, one’s errors, upon further reflection, might not be 
errors at all. The self-scrutinizing process is initiated on the basis of supposed wrong-doing and 
is applicable to the entire range of blameworthy action, from serious errors to less serious ones, 
and even to those actions which are not blameworthy but initially appeared to be so. This is 
another point Bittner underappreciates. Regret is involved in a range of experiences through the 
process of self-scrutiny. 
                                                          
33 Aristotle, NE 1143a9. 
34 Aristotle states, “[F]or one has all the virtues if and only if one has prudence.” NE 1143a9. 
35 NE 1145a5 
36 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 255. 
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  Another form of improvement occurs from envisioning future pain and attempting to 
avoid it. That is, by mentally time traveling into the future, one can contemplate the pain one 
would experience if a current choice were made. The mechanism would involve projecting 
oneself into a future time, F, at which time one commits the hypothetical choice under 
consideration in the present.37 At a later time, F₁ , one anticipates the causal sequence of how the 
choice would unfold through a reasonable extrapolation from past experiences. At yet a later 
time, F₂ , the agent feels a regret-like response to the action he took at F. The present self then 
decides to avoid the proposed action which functions as a means to obviate future pain at, F₂ , if 
this future pain outweighs the current perceived pleasure of committing the choice.  It is this 
speculative pain, on balance, from the future event that functions as a deterrent on the agent’s 
current behavior. It is in this way that speculative reasoning about future pain encourages self-
improvement.   
The second argument for the claim that regret is a means to moral improvement can be 
deduced from what was stated earlier. We now understand that recognizing our past 
transgressions is an act of valuing or disvaluing. This is because we cannot view moral facts – 
i.e. facts that are salient to our value system – from an emotionally agnostic perspective. These 
types of facts are bound up with how we feel. Insofar as one disvalues, one feels pain. Through a 
process of behavioral modification – either through dispositions or speculative time-travel – it is 
pain that motivates us to avoid bad actions. Through this process of pain avoidance we are 
simultaneously optimizing our behavior. Since our pain results from bad actions, and these we 
intend to avoid, we are not making the same mistakes repeatedly. Our behavior progressively 
                                                          
37 This first stage could also occur in the present if the agent envisioned this instead.  
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reaches the point where our actions more accurately reflect our values. This behavioral 
improvement, or optimization, is a way of learning from our past mistakes.38  
If we return to Achilleus, we can surmise how he might morally improve. First, he would 
recognize his mistake of withdrawing from the battle after being dishonored. It was a mistake 
because his best friend, who is more important than withdrawing from battle to avenge 
Agamemnon, died as a result. The pain associated with this mistaken decision would incentivize 
him to avoid repeating it. In future circumstances similar enough to trigger his pain, Achilleus 
would be more likely to avoid repeating the same mistake. Over time, he would habituate the 
regret-avoiding decision. That is, he will have learned which scenarios require him to avoid 
choosing similarly (to his prior mistake) in order to protect what matters to him, and he will have 
learned how to make the correct choice.  
V. Similarity to Agent-Regret  
Some might object that agent-regret is a counterexample to this account because a.) it is a 
form of regret, but b.) lacks any element worthy of recognition or recognitional-learning, insofar 
as it is a response to blameless behavior. In response, I argue that in fact agent-regret is 
consistent with elements of my account. Even with the blameless wrongs of agent-regret, there 
are reasons to recognize, learn and display regret about the action. However, this is not to say 
that blameless actions are as worthy of these values as the objects of paradigmatic regret; they 
merely have enough similarities to qualify for a lesser share. Hence, agent-regret is not a 
counterexample because it is inaccessible to the values in the same degree as the paradigmatic 
case and it is a deviant form of regret, with some key differences I examine.39  
                                                          
38 By “learning,” I simply mean recognizing certain facts and doing something further with those facts. 
39 I thank Jeffrey Helmreich for this characterization of the counterexample.  
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In Moral Luck, Bernard Williams describes a scenario where a driver accidentally hits a 
pedestrian.40 Williams uses this scenario to help elucidate regret. While general regret is 
anything that suggests the thought “how much better it would have been otherwise” and can 
apply to events beyond those for which we are causally responsible, agent-regret is a response to 
the agent’s own actions.41 Agent-regret “can extend far beyond what one intentionally did to 
almost anything for which one was causally responsible in virtue of something one intentionally 
did.”42 What is interesting about agent-regret is that the feelings one has toward one’s own 
actions – whether voluntary or not – are distinct from those of an observer. This is true even in 
cases where neither the observer nor the agent voluntarily performed the action. Williams uses 
the example of a child being run over by a lorry driver to show that he is in a unique position, as 
the one who is causally responsible, and has a unique emotional response. He states:   
The lorry driver who, through no fault of his, runs over a child, will feel differently from any spectator, 
even a spectator next to him in the cab…Doubtless…people will try, in comforting him, to move the driver 
from this state of feeling, move him indeed from where he is to something more like the place of a 
spectator…We feel sorry for the driver, but that sentiment co-exists with, indeed presupposes, that there is 
something special about his relation to this happening, something which cannot merely be eliminated by 
the consideration that it was not his fault.43 
This example and his preceding discussion illustrate that there are at least three types of 
scenarios where regret seems appropriate. First, there is general regret that applies to scenarios 
for which anyone would think it better if things had been otherwise. This includes events in 
which one is not causally responsible. For example, the child getting hit from a spectator’s point 
of view is worthy of general regret because things would be better in the world had they been 
otherwise. Second, there is regret that is the result of an agent’s blameworthy actions, e.g. if the 
                                                          
40 Bernard Williams. Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981). 
41 Williams, Moral Luck, 124. 
42 ibid. 
43 ibid. 
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lorry driver intended to hit the child, then he would feel this type of regret. Third, there is agent-
regret that is the result of an agent’s non-blameworthy actions, as in Williams’ actual lorry driver 
example.  
Some could argue that my account is compatible with agent-regret. It is plausible to 
assume that immediately after hitting the child, the driver would be unsure if he is blameworthy. 
We could picture him, immediately after the event, checking his brakes, remembering whether 
his car maintenance was up to date, wondering if the prior late night had played a role, 
rehearsing in his mind the moments before the impact to check if he was momentarily distracted, 
etc. The driver would be engaged in the recognition process that is constitutive of my account of 
regret. The difference, however, is that upon completing this process the driver would realize he 
is not at fault. He would neither gain clarity nor manage his self-conception – without being in 
error, these values do not obtain.44 Moreover, this process is very similar to the self-scrutiny of 
recognitional-learning because there is a prompting of quasi-regret, this is not actual regret but 
potential regret, which initiates the process. There is also a social component to the display of 
regret that occurs in agent-regret that is similar to my view which is discussed in the following 
chapter. 
To the extent that the driver undergoes the processes of recognition and recognitional-
learning, he gains the values of paradigmatic regret. Since the self-scrutinizing involved in agent-
regret and paradigmatic regret is identical, the values inherent in the process would reward 
anyone who performs it. However, the agent feeling agent-regret does not receive all of the value 
of the paradigmatic case because values of the paradigmatic case include being clear about how 
one erred and improving from this recognition. In the case of agent-regret, since the agent has 
                                                          
44 Certain derivative values would be appropriate. He would gain clarity with respect to why he is not blameworthy 
and he would perhaps improve his value of himself. However, the values of clarity and self-reconciliation have 
different content when one is blameworthy.  
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not erred, he would not receive these values. My account is compatible with agent-regret insofar 
as some of the values overlap and this does not pose a threat to my account.     
One could also argue that my account of regret is compatible with agent-regret because 
self-alienation is common to both. On my view, pain is associated with self-alienation which 
results from not being able to reconcile my current values with my prior self. And being 
irreconcilable is also a key feature of agent-regret. Perhaps, then, this type of pain is the relevant 
common denominator. Consider this case:  
Achilleus after being dishonored by Agamemnon does not withdraw from the fighting. 
Instead, Achilleus continues to fight alongside his fellow soldiers, including his friend 
Patroklos. Through no moral fault of his own, and certainly not consciously, Achilleus 
kills his friend. He throws a spear at Hektor who avoids it at the last second by moving 
his head. The spear hits Patroklos and he is fatally wounded. Achilleus feels responsible.   
In this case, Achilleus feels regret. He is pained from being causally responsible by throwing the 
spear, because it led to his friend’s death. There is a sense in which Achilleus does not identify 
with the killer of his friend. His prior actions are inconsistent with his current values and hence 
he feels the pain of alienation. This unique perspective of Achilleus is agent-regret because he 
caused the death accidentally. It also consistent with my account insofar as it generates a pain of 
self-alienation.  
In response, my account is not similar to agent-regret to warrant this comparison because 
the self-alienation of agent-regret is not caused in the right way. The conditions appropriate for 
self-alienation are that the agent needs to play a role in what he does. The agent needs to 
contribute, and feel that he is contributing, to his self-determination. There is no sense in which 
the agent at the time of acting feels as though he is contributing to his life in a meaningful way. 
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He has not chosen the action (and its likely ramifications) in light of his wider values and life 
goals.45  
If we consider our example of Achilleus throwing the spear and killing his friend, 
Patroklos, we see that killing his friend was not part of the reasonably calculated outcomes that 
were envisioned at the time of acting. The envisioned outcomes were killing Hektor or perhaps 
hitting the ground. The killing of his friend did not factor into his decision-making process and 
was not an expression of his values. Though he ended up killing his friend, he did not intend to 
kill him. Achilleus was causally responsible but not in the right way to be alienated from his 
projects, desires and deliberative faculty. This means that he is not alienated from himself in the 
relevant way to count as paradigmatic regret.  
VI. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that regret is worthwhile because it has value. First, regret is 
valuable because it allows us to access the regretful act through a process I call “recognition.” 
Recognition involves attending to all of the salient aspects of a regretful event given our current 
normative or moral framework. As we revisit the event, we are likely to become aware of 
heretofore unknown or unappreciated aspects. We gain clarity from this process. Recognition 
also puts in perspective our actions and might allow for self-acceptance, especially in cases 
where regret is difficult to overcome and negatively affects one’s quality of life.  
Second, when we are able to take regretful experiences and use them to improve, we are 
engaged in a learning process. This I call “recognitional-learning” to reflect the fact that the 
value of recognition is still present. This process was shown through an Aristotelian framework 
where the pain of the regretful event is used to shape future decision-making behavior. Then one 
                                                          
45 This is not meant to be an unnecessarily burdensome moral outlook that informs every choice – many choices we 
make are not of this kind. However, there are outcomes of our actions which are accidental and this implies that they 
were not part of the reasonable outcomes which we envisioned at the time of acting.  
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becomes habituated to non-regretful behavior. I also explored the possibility of mentally 
projecting oneself into the future and acting in the present as to avoid the future imagined pain.  
One objection that we considered was the similarity with agent-regret. We saw many 
similarities with agent-regret including the locus of pain in self-alienation. This was potentially 
problematic because agent-regret does not seem amenable to the values of recognition and 
recognitional-learning. This is because clarity, self-reconciliation and self-improvement only 
make sense when the agent feels as though he is involved in the decision-making process. The 
upshot was that either my account of regret needed to be amended or the values I attributed to 
regret are inadequate because they do not apply to all types of regret. However, this objection 
failed because it did not take into account the right kind of cause for self-alienation. Once this 
was addressed, we saw that agent-regret was not similar in the right way to share all of the values 
of clarity, self-reconciliation and self-improvement.   
The purpose of this chapter was to argue for the personal value of regret. However, as I 
argue in the following chapter, the display of regret has a distinctive social value. The display of 
regret has meaning to members of a community because of what it communicates.  
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Chapter 4: Social Values of Displaying Regret 
I. Introduction  
Rudigar Bittner, in “Is It Reasonable to Regret?” argues that regret has little if any 
redeemable value and is therefore unreasonable.1 For him, regret impairs an agent’s ability to 
learn from mistakes, negatively contributes to one’s character and unnecessarily multiplies pain. 
All of these charges against regret are ways in which the agent is impacted by his own regret. 
Regret in this context is being evaluated as a personal phenomenon. I met these challenges in the 
prior chapter where I argued that, contrary to Bittner et al., regret is valuable in the personal 
realm.2 However, neither I nor Bittner discussed the social performance of regret and how this 
impacts our social practices. 
The discussion in this chapter is on the social value of displaying regret. As I discuss later, 
feeling the actual emotion might not be necessary for this social value. If this is true then it is 
not, precisely speaking, a value of regret itself. It is, rather, a value of a regret-like display. 
However, I do not want to suggest that the connection between feeling regret and displaying it is 
merely a contingent one in all respects. They are conceptually linked in that the emergence of the 
display (and what we take as acceptable enactments of that display) is non-contingently 
connected to the private mental states of the emotion. We would not have the idea of displaying 
regret unless there was regret to display. So the paradigmatic case of displaying regret would 
appear to involve feeling the appropriate emotions. They may also be causally linked; it may be 
difficult to display regret in most cases without feeling it.3 So although I will speak of instances 
                                                          
1 Rudigar Bittner. "Is It Reasonable to Regret Things One Did?" The Journal of Philosophy 89, no. 5 (1992).  
2 The values of regret to the agent I argue in the prior chapter are clarity and self-improvement.  
3 It is worth noting that the connection between emotions and display can also work in the opposite direction. 
Instead of the emotion being the precondition for the display, the display can lead to feeling the emotion. In the legal 
realm this is often a presupposition of certain rules and regulations. That, when enacted faithfully by the 
constituency, people will not only behave better but also become better people (with the right feelings).  
70 
 
where one can perform regret-like behavior, our ability to identify this behavior as regret-like is 
conditioned by its conceptual and perhaps causal links to a genuine mental state. And, it bears 
mention that cases of displaying regret without feeling it are deviations, acting “as if,” which is 
therefore parasitic on the standard “felt” cases.4 
Displays of regret are valuable in what they communicate to others and how they regulate 
our interpersonal behavior. That is, displays of regret have social significance. Actions in the 
social realm not only communicate how we feel about one another and how we feel about the 
social practice in which we engage, they also communicate how we should reasonably be 
expected to behave in the future.  
To argue for the claim that displaying regret has social value, I will briefly discuss behavior 
as a performance and how this relates to regret. Here, I draw on the work of Erving Goffman’s 
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Then, by analogy to etiquette, I argue that displaying 
regret has two primary social functions: regulating interpersonal social behavior and providing 
commentary on social practices. Next, I address a concern about the nature of regret’s social 
function: does one need to feel regret for it have social value or is merely acting as if one feels it 
sufficient? I use the phenomenon of the well-behaved psychopath as an explanatory device to 
articulate different points of view. Well-behaved psychopaths, unlike paradigmatic psychopaths, 
often strive to understand and conform to social norms. They do this although they share similar 
psycho-emotional limitations with normal psychopaths. Ultimately, I argue against a requirement 
of genuine feeling by stating one does not need to be authentic as is commonly understood. 
Instead, I present an alternative understanding of what it means to be authentic and the 
conditions necessary for its satisfaction.   
 
                                                          
4 I thank Jeffrey Helmreich for this and other key formulations in this chapter.  
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II. Behavior as Performance 
In The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life, Erving Goffman explains how our public 
behavior can be understood as a performance.5 By “performance,” he means “all the activity of a 
given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence in any way any of the other 
participants.”6 This broad characterization includes everything another person could find 
meaningful. Agents necessarily communicate something in the act of presenting themselves to an 
observer. This communication can be explicit when the agent intends to convey specific 
information or implicit when the agent conveys information that was unintended. Goffman notes: 
It has been suggested that the performer can rely upon his audience to accept minor cues as a sign of 
something important about his performance. This convenient fact has an inconvenient implication. By 
virtue of the same sign-accepting tendency, the audience may misunderstand the meaning that a cue was 
designed to convey, or may read an embarrassing meaning into the gestures or events that were accidental, 
inadvertent, or incidental and not meant by the performer to carry any meaning whatsoever.7  
The upshot is that when agents are involved in social interactions and are engaged in 
performances, their behavior – even that which is unintended – is meaningfully interpreted.  
A performance is meaningfully interpreted in a context. The interpretation of an agent’s 
performance is conditioned by the type of social interaction or social practice in which it takes 
place. For instance, smirking and shrugging one’s shoulders on a basketball court in response to 
an insult or challenge could be interpreted as unwavering confidence. Here the relevant context 
is a competitive environment where threats are used to break one’s concentration and to secure a 
competitive advantage. Being impervious to these kinds of tactics is praiseworthy. Smirks and 
shrugs are signs of this imperviousness. However, if one smirks and shrugs one’s shoulders 
                                                          
5 Erving Goffman. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Anchor Books, 2008. 
6 Goffman, 15.  
7 Goffman, 51. 
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before a judge in a court of law, it is interpreted as contemptuous behavior.8 These actions are 
blameworthy because they disrespect or degrade the legal process and the people engaged in 
administering it. The context of the social practice is useful in determining how a particular 
action should be interpreted. Given the nature of social behavior and the importance of context, 
we shall now see how the social manifestation of regret is meaningful.  
III. Regret as Performance 
In the prior chapter, we saw regret function in the personal realm. Regret was an agent’s 
emotional response of recognizing that his prior actions (or non-actions) transgressed his current 
values. The focus was on the agent’s understanding of his own misdeeds irrespective of the 
awareness of others. The beneficiary was the agent himself – he gained clarity and self-
improvement. On the other hand, regret as a social phenomenon results from an agent’s 
presentation. Regret becomes a social phenomenon when the agent shows regret as part of his 
public performance. In this capacity, his emotional display communicates socially relevant 
information to those who observe it. It not only provides commentary on the social practice, but 
it also addresses those within it. It is this social feature of regret that makes it contextually 
significant.  
This social feature of regret operates similarly to etiquette. Etiquette in the philosophical 
literature is a system of normative rules governing social behavior.9 Judith Martin defines it as: 
“a complex system of contextually dependent judgments, in which competing obligations, 
motivations, and circumstances must be carefully weighed.”10 This system of contextually 
                                                          
8 These seem like plausible candidates for contempt of court, especially when one juror was reprimanded and 
threatened with the same charge for yawning. Caitlin Liu. "Sleepy Juror Gets Rude Awakening." Los Angeles 
Times. April 20, 2005.  
9 Judith Martin and Gunther S. Stent. "I Think; Therefore I Thank: A Philosophy of Etiquette." The American 
Scholar 59, no. 2 (1990): 237-54. 
10 Judith Martin. "A Philosophy of Etiquette." Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 137, no. 3 (1993): 
351.  
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dependent judgments has a functional role in social practices. That role is to regulate behavior 
and communicate information through symbolic representation. Hence, the functions are 
regulative and symbolic. I will discuss these in turn.  
The regulative function refers to the way etiquette maintains social cohesion by eliminating 
or minimizing interpersonal tensions between members. When agents act in ways that are 
understood to be polite or considerate, fewer social norms are transgressed and as a result fewer 
people are offended. And if fewer people are offended, communities will generally experience 
fewer incidents of social malfunction such as crime, over-burdened legal systems, societal 
polarization, etc.11  
Regret has a similar regulative function. This is illustrated in Bernard Williams’ Moral Luck. 
The example he gives is of a truck driver who accidentally, and through no fault of his own, hits 
a child. In this case, the driver feels regret although he is not morally responsible.12 What is 
interesting is not what he feels, but what a hypothetical spectator would feel. Williams notes: 
Doubtless, and rightly, people will try, in comforting him, to move the driver from this state of feeling, 
move him indeed from where he is to something more like the place of a spectator, but it is important that 
this is seen as something that should need to be done, and indeed some doubt would be felt about a driver 
who too blandly or readily moved to that position (italics mine).13 
 
Here we see that if the driver is “too blandly or readily” moved to that of a non-regretful 
spectator, others would likely disapprove. The reason is that such easily assuaged regret appears 
insincere or disturbingly shallow. And not feeling regret in the right way indicates a failure to 
recognize the harm that was done or the respect that was owed to the victim. Moreover, it 
                                                          
11 This is not the only form of regulating communities. Legal systems also provide a recourse to social 
waywardness. The difference is that the regulative function of regret is preventive and the legal function is largely 
retributive. When a grievance is no longer amenable to social pressure, legal measures take over are usually more 
severe.  
12 This is agent-regret which is a specific form of regret that Williams identifies.  
13 Bernard Williams. Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981.) 28. 
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violates social norms of acting in ways that are sensitive to the welfare of others. Observers who 
are sensitive to these violations of social norms are liable to feel offense. These types of 
transgressions encourage the breakdown of social harmony. The regulative function of regret 
maintains and reinforces it. 
 It is important to add that this regulative function is not only active in the behavior of 
others – those for whom the displays of regret are intended to reach – the agent herself is also 
subject to a course of expected future behavior. In the act of displaying regret, the speaker 
signals to others that this is how she views things, and is therefore answerable to them for 
remaining true to this display. That is, if the display is to be meaningful it implies that the person 
who regrets is observant of the harm or potential harm that happened and this observance will 
condition her future action. That one’s future should change in light of one’s regretful display is 
a natural consequence of regretting. If we return to the lorry driver who displayed regret after 
hitting a child, we understand from his regretful display that he is observant of the harm done to 
the child and those who care about the child. We also understand that the driver must act in 
certain ways to make good, so to speak, on his regret. His subsequent actions or inaction must 
reinforce the message that he understands the harm he caused. If not, the sincerity of his regret is 
undermined. For example, the driver might be obligated to show: a certain seriousness when 
discussing this incident in the future, a willingness to attend the funeral if the child dies, a 
concern for the parents’ feelings, a willingness to cooperate with the police investigation 
although he believes himself to be free from moral blame, a certain resistance to be consoled (as 
Williams points out), etc. If subsequent events demand that one of the above actions be shown, 
and it is not shown, then the driver will be viewed as violating the obligations imposed on him 
by his display of regret. In short, the driver’s regret will seem fraudulent. One could describe the 
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regulative behavior imposed on the agent like this: when one displays regret, one is opening 
oneself to be held to acting in ways consistent with this recognition in the future.  
The symbolic function of etiquette is “a system of symbols whose semantic content provides 
for predictability in social relations, especially among strangers.”14 Symbols give us information 
about how we are to understand one another and predict their attitude and behavior within a 
given social practice. Clothing, gestures, words, etc. can function symbolically. Perhaps the 
commonest symbolic gesture in the Anglosphere is one of good-will: an outstretched hand and a 
smile. In Japan, this might be the bowing of the head. Knowing the meaning of these signs, and 
their opposite, can be useful in interpreting another’s thoughts and intentions.  
Regret also functions symbolically. Expressing regret, remorse, self-recrimination and other 
forms of post-decisional sadness is a way to show one’s emotional sincerity. In many cases, non-
verbal symbols of regret are relied upon to confirm whether or not the agent is being truthful 
with what he presents himself as feeling. Facial expressions and other types of symbolic body 
language are less easily manipulated, and therefore more often seen as trusted messengers.15 This 
is most notable in the courthouse. As mentioned earlier, displaying contemptuous behavior, such 
as smirking, shrugging one’s shoulders, making outbursts and yawning toward the judge is 
interpreted as disrespecting the legal process. On the other hand, showing sincere displays of 
regret and remorse toward the judge can lessen one’s sentencing.16   
 
 
                                                          
14 Martin, Philosophy of Etiquette, 354. 
15 Mind reading is primarily the ability to recognize facial expressions in order to “predict, explain, mold and 
manipulate each other’s behavior.” This ability is evolutionarily acquired. C. M. Heyes and C. D. Frith. "The 
Cultural Evolution of Mind Reading." Science 344, no. 6190 (2014): 1243091. 
16 “Legal scholars and courts appreciate the significance of remorse in criminal law. Remorse is held to be an 
appropriate consideration, particularly during the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings.” from “So You're 
Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Criminal Law.” Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Online 
Mar 2014, 42 (1) 39-48. 
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IV. Does Authenticity Matter?  
It may be noticed that on the preceding argument, one has reason to display regret to others, 
quite apart from whether one is actually feeling it. The regulative and symbolic value of the 
performance stands independently of the internal psychology of the performer. Indeed, given that 
it has these values, it seems to follow that one should display regret regardless of whether one 
can muster the genuine, affective emotional state.  
But such unfelt displays could be seen as insincere, or otherwise inauthentic. In other words, 
one may worry that it is wrong – at best unvirtuous – to display regret, whatever its social value, 
unless one is actually in the raw, emotional throes of feeling regretful. To explore this question, I 
will consider the case of the psychopath and, especially, the well-behaved psychopath. 
Psychopaths are interesting because they do not have the same inner psycho-emotional life as 
the rest of us, and so lack that crucial reference point, but can still function successfully in our 
social practices. Although a significant percentage of prisoners are psychopaths, this represents a 
small fraction of the total number of psychopaths, most of whom are not incarcerated.17 My 
primary focus will be on those who are not incarcerated. It is by looking at these psychopaths, 
how they function and what success they have, that we can better understand the ways in which 
expressions or displays of regret have social value. First, I will briefly explain psychopathy.  
Psychopathy is subset of characteristics that constitute anti-personality disorder (APD). The 
most prominent symptoms include: “remorselessness, callousness, deceitfulness, egocentricity, 
failure to form close emotional bonds, low anxiety proneness, superficial charm, and 
                                                          
17 Psychopaths account for 1% of the population, but are 15-20% of the male prison population in North America. 
Most psychopaths are either on probation, parole or not in the criminal system. Kent A Kiehl and Morris B 
Hoffman. “The Criminal Psychopath: History, Neuroscience, Treatment, and Economics.” Jurimetrics vol. 51 
(2011): 355-397.  
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externalization of blame.”18 Assessments of psychopathy take the form of measuring an 
individual’s psychological traits against a checklist of recognized symptoms.19 If the individual 
scores within range, they are diagnosed with psychopathy. This means that individuals are on a 
continuum – some may just reach the threshold of psychopathy while others may exceed it by a 
wide margin.  
The upshot is that some psychopaths can function well in society. One commentator 
describes these patients as:   
highly functioning businessmen—men of the world…scientists, physicians and even psychiatrists. These people 
were able to navigate the demands of modern society, despite having the same clinical constellations as their 
less-functioning brethren, including grandiosity, impulsivity, remorselessness and shallow affect. These 
functioning psychopaths have become the objects of much recent attention.20 
These are known as the well-behaved or successful psychopaths.21 By “well-behaved” and 
“successful,” I mean that these individuals are able to function in social settings with a 
substantial degree of achievement in addition to staying out of jail. Well-behaved psychopaths 
are functional despite not feeling empathetic emotions in the same way we ordinarily think one 
should.22 They lack much or all of the capacity that allows empathetic moral promptings to 
dissuade them from acting in ways hurtful to others. Yet, they are able to act in ways consistent 
with a sincere regretful display. This may seem puzzling but their proficiency at displaying the 
appropriate emotional response – even without completely feeling it – is convincing. They use 
                                                          
18 Jennifer L. Skeem et al. "Psychopathic Personality or Personalities? Exploring Potential Variants of Psychopathy 
and Their Implications for Risk Assessment." Aggression and Violent Behavior 8, no. 5 (2003): 513-46. 
19 The gold standard for psychopathy diagnosis is the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (Hare, 1991) developed by 
Robert Hare which includes twenty psychological traits. Gregory W. Stevens et al. "Successful Psychopaths: Are 
They Unethical Decision-Makers and Why?" Journal of Business Ethics 105, no. 2 (2011): 140. 
20 Kiehl and Hoffman, “The Criminal Psychopath.” 
21 Sometimes referred to as the “the adaptive or subclinical psychopath: an individual who displays many of the core 
features of psychopathic personality (psychopathy) while achieving success.” Scott Lilienfeld et al. “Successful 
Psychopathy: A Scientific Status Report.” Current Directions in Psychological Science 24, no. 4 (August 2015): 
298.  
22 I am referring to both those who feel no empathetic pangs and those who feel it moderately but not as much as the 
average person would.  
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this to their advantage and are more disposed than the average person to climb the corporate 
ladder or other tier-based systems.23 
There have been numerous proposals regarding the likely professions into which these 
types of individuals populate.24 The Atlantic describes the story of how a neuroscientist, James 
Fallon, inadvertently discovered his psychopathy while researching psychopaths:  
A neuroscientist is working in his laboratory one day when he thinks he has stumbled upon a big mistake. 
He is researching Alzheimer's and using his healthy family members' brain scans as a control, while 
simultaneously reviewing the fMRIs of murderous psychopaths for a side project. It appears, though, that 
one of the killers' scans has been shuffled into the wrong batch…But no mistake has been made: The brain 
scan that mirrors those of the psychopaths is his own.25 
 
This high-functioning neurologist has learned how to interact in his professional and personal 
life although he is emotionally deficient. The innumerable daily social scenarios that are 
navigated depend on how well Fallon produces the right kinds of emotional responses at the right 
times. It also depends on others believing that Fallon is acting and responding appropriately to 
social cues. Although he is able to function successfully in these environments, he is only acting 
as if he feels these emotions. In fact, he does not or does not as strongly as his behavior would 
suggest.    
Now we can explore the question: Is the well-behaved psychopath justified when he 
communicates regret or is he doing something objectionable? 
Although the well-behaved psychopath can display regret, displaying might not be 
enough to be socially valuable if such displays violate the requirements of authenticity. Being 
                                                          
23 Paul Babiak and Robert D. Hare. Snakes in Suits: Understanding and Surviving the Psychopaths in Your Office. 
New York: Harper Business, 2018. 
24 “Several authors have conjectured that psychopathic individuals are overrepresented in certain vocations, 
including politics, business, military combat, law enforcement, firefighting, and risky sports (Babiak & Hare, 2006; 
Fowles & Dindo, 2006; Stevens, Deuling, & Armenakis, 2012).” in “Successful Psychopathy: A Scientific Status 
Report.” 
25 Judith Ohikuare. "Life as a Nonviolent Psychopath." The Atlantic. March 10, 2018. 
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“authentic” is the view that one should live a life, in all of its manifestations, that in some way 
corresponds to one’s true self. “True self” is taken to mean an accurate reflection of who one is. 
Let us call this the “authenticity view.” I will present two versions of this view. Version one 
pertains to how an agent lives his life. This version has two parts. Part one characterizes one’s 
true self as something relatively stable in one’s being, e.g. this would include one’s values, 
personality, core beliefs, etc. Part two characterizes one’s true self as a function of one’s 
freedom. Version two pertains to the agent’s speech acts. Being authentic on this view is a kind 
of sincerity; it amounts to performing speech acts that accurately convey what the speaker is 
indeed feeling or undergoing, and speech acts are felicitous when they sincerely match the 
emotional state of the agent. Both versions of authenticity will be challenged. That is, I do not 
believe that agents, in this case psychopaths, need to be authentic by these rigid 
characterizations. Instead, psychopaths can retain what authenticity is attempting to capture, 
which is sincerity, through a different set of conditions. In the end, I argue that agents can be 
sincere in their behavior even if they are “inauthentic” according to the authenticity view.   
In the Ethics of Authenticity, Charles Taylor identifies what he takes to be the source of the 
two ways one can be authentic.26 The first begins with Jean Jacques Rousseau who replaces our 
connection with god with being connected to something special within us.27 Rousseau does this 
by presenting “the issue of morality as that of our following a voice of nature within us.”28 And 
recognizing that our “salvation comes from recovering authentic moral contact with ourselves.”29 
To be consistent with one’s true self is to discover one’s core set of beliefs, traits and values and 
act in ways consistent with them.  
                                                          
26 Charles Taylor. The Ethics of Authenticity. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1999). 
27 Whether this connection to god is located somewhere in the world or somewhere within us does not make a 
difference for our purposes. 
28 Taylor, Ethics of Authenticity, 27.  
29 ibid. 
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Taylor notes that Rousseau also advocates the view that authenticity is being free to choose 
the direction of one’s own life; it is an act of self-determination. “It is the idea that I am free 
when I decide for myself what concerns me, rather than being shaped by external influences.”30 
Rousseau has apparently presented dichotomous views of being authentic. On the one hand, 
authenticity is related to discovering and being grateful for what is within. On the other hand, 
authenticity is concerned with self-creating through the freedom of choice. This dichotomy is 
sometimes referred to as a “self-discovery and self-creation” or a “gratitude and creativity” 
framework.”31  
Whether or not the psychopath is being authentic depends on which conception of 
authenticity is operative. The straightforward case to make is that the psychopath is authentic 
when viewed from the creativity framework. When the well-behaved psychopath is learning 
social behavior, he is expressing freedom and functioning from a creativity framework. Quite 
frequently psychopaths seek help because they want to overcome their social ineptitude.32 The 
reasons for this are not entirely clear to me. Perhaps, there is an underdeveloped sense of 
empathy and the psychopathic agent wants this part to be more active. Or, maybe, the impetus to 
change is the recognition that modifying social behavior will ultimately be in the psychopath’s 
best interest – he will, on average, get more of what he wants and less of what he does not. In 
any event, the exercising of his freedom to seek counseling is an expression of the creativity 
                                                          
30 ibid.  
31 These are the terms used by Neil Levy (2011), Adam Kadlac (2018), and Erik Parens (2005).   
32 As successful psychopath, James Fallon states, “I started with simple things of how I interact with my wife, my 
sister, and my mother. Even though they’ve always been close to me, I don't treat them all that well. I treat strangers 
pretty well—really well, and people tend to like me when they meet me—but I treat my family the same way, like 
they're just somebody at a bar. I treat them well, but I don't treat them in a special way. That’s the big problem.” 
From, Ohikuare. "Life as a Nonviolent Psychopath.” 
81 
 
view of authenticity. If this were the only condition to authenticity, well-behaved (and perhaps 
ill-behaved) psychopaths would seem to satisfy it.33 
However, this is not the only claim to authenticity. The other view, that one should 
discover their “true self” and act in light of that, seems troublesome for the well-behaved 
psychopath. His deepest feelings are not concerned with a consideration of others. Commentators 
have tried to reconcile issues similar to this in the enhancement debate. The debate is whether or 
not technological enhancements, e.g. anti-anxiety medication, anti-depressants, Adderall, 
steroids, etc., allow us to be more of who we are or if they militate against it. That is, do these 
enhancements increase authenticity or diminish it? Proponents of enhancements “view these 
same technologies…not as a threat to authenticity, but rather as tools that can facilitate our 
authentic efforts at self-discovery and self-creation.”34 If enhancements can be aids to self-
discovery, then psychopaths might be able to use their social awareness training to access their 
true self.  
The central claim for suggesting enhancements aid self-discovery is that they put us in 
touch with parts of ourselves that were previously inaccessible. An example will illustrate the 
point:  
Suppose Mary in her childhood was outgoing, resilient, carefree and optimistic. 
However, it has been many years since then and she has become a bitter pessimist. In 
addition, she spent time in jail for tax evasion. Her time behind bars was traumatic and 
now she is on anti-depressants. For the first time in years, as a result of anti-depressant 
medication, she feels like her true self – she feels like a kid again.  
 
                                                          
33 Ill-behaved psychopaths would be acting authentically because they also express creativity.   
34 Erik Parens. "Authenticity and Ambivalence: Toward Understanding the Enhancement Debate." The Hastings 
Center Report 35, no. 3 (2005). 
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The anti-depressants in this case are instrumental in removing the obstacles between the agent 
and herself, so to speak. The years of hard living combined with difficult trauma has barricaded 
the part of her character with which she most identifies. Medical enhancements are a means to 
access this inner self. Examples of this kind are ubiquitous. Gender reassignment procedures, 
weight-loss surgeries, plastic surgeries, psychological medication, etc. are ways in which 
technology allows individuals to get in touch with their true selves. As Levy notes: 
The inner voice to which we listen, and which tells us what being human is for us, may not whisper of 
acceptance. Instead, its message might be that we should change, to bring inner and outer into harmony. 
Self-discovery might require change from us, and to that extent it is entirely compatible with the use of 
various enhancements. Just as the person suffering from Gender Identity Disorder might come to be who 
they…really are by means of an intervention, so the depressed person might become who they are by 
means of Prozac.35 
Well-behaved psychopaths are similarly using enhancements in the form of rehabilitative 
treatments. However, they are not attempting to live up to their authentic personal self. This is 
what they are trying to avoid insofar as that authentic self is someone more callous and less 
empathetic. They do not want to be a social misfit but instead want to integrate better into their 
community. Instead, what the well-behaved psychopath is seeking from this type of behavioral 
enhancement is living in a way that is consistent with his authentic social self. He is a member of 
a social practice and identifies with a social role. The attributes of his social self are what he 
actively works to obtain. He is consciously acquiring the skills to respond in appropriate and 
empathetic ways even if he lacks the full empathy to back it up. The closer he can bring these 
two together – his social self and his actions – the less alienation he experiences. The well-
behaved psychopath is no longer acting qua individual or private agent. He is acting qua socially 
aware agent or qua regretful agent. By choosing to adopt a social role, he is using creative 
elements of authenticity. And by identifying with that social role, he is using elements of self-
                                                          
35 Neil Levy. "Enhancing Authenticity." Journal of Applied Philosophy 28, no. 3 (2011): 316. 
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discovery. Well-behaved psychopaths, then, appear to meet both conditions of the first version of 
the authenticity view.  
The second version of the authenticity view concerns speech acts. Specifically, the claim is 
that psychopaths are not being felicitous in their regretful utterances because their emotions at 
the time of utterance do not match what that utterance is commonly thought to express. First, I 
will explain the “authenticity view” of speech acts which are called “expressives” and how 
psychopaths seem to fall short of their satisfying conditions. Then, I will give an account of how 
a well-behaved psychopath’s utterance can be authentic through a position called “stance-
taking.” The upshot is that well-behaved psychopaths have a claim to authenticity which 
legitimates their regretful speech acts.  
A problem with speech is deception, or insincerity. Sincerity conditions are conditions that 
require the speaker’s utterance to reflect his psychological state. “A speech act is sincere only if 
the speaker is in the psychological state that her speech act expresses.”36 The assumption here is 
that speech acts actually express psychological states. Indeed, some do. A common example is 
“ouch” which expresses the psychological state of pain. Speech acts that express one’s 
psychological state are called “expressives.” This is the default view for apologies or utterances 
of regret. Regretful utterances are seen as expressives and if they do not express the agent’s 
psychological state, on this view, they are insincere.37 
Well-behaved psychopaths cannot meet these conditions. As was previously discussed, the 
psychopath is incapable of feeling the types of empathetic emotions we usually associate with 
regret. If they were to make a regretful utterance, it would clearly be insincere as an expressive 
because there is no psychological state or not the right sort of psychological state being 
                                                          
36 Mitchell Green, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). "Speech Acts", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2017). 
37 John Searle, “A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts,” in Searle, Expression and Meaning. Cambridge. (1985): 15. 
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expressed. One could even argue that the well-behaved psychopath who might feel a low-
intensity regretful emotion is also insincere because they do not meet the emotional threshold for 
the utterance to qualify as a sincere expressive. This would be plausible if the emotional standard 
of expressives is that of a psychologically normal adult. 
   However, on an alternative position, well-behaved psychopaths can meet the standards of 
sincerity. First, let us review what phenomenon we are attempting to characterize. The well-
behaved psychopath wants to be a better member of the community. He is aware of his 
emotional and psychological deficits and seeks out behavioral therapy. He is now aware of 
previously unknown social norms and tries to live up to them. Our task is to characterize this 
scenario as sincere or insincere. On its face, the well-behaved psychopath is doing everything in 
his power to behave correctly. Although he is not satisfying the sincerity condition for an 
expressive when he utters a regretful speech act, he is satisfying the condition for stance-taking. 
“A stance,” as Jeffrey Helmreich notes, is “a way we are disposed to act toward others in light of 
some normative claim, or position, that we accept.”38 This means that stance-taking involves two 
components: accepting a position and being disposed to act in light of it.  
Accepting a position is not merely believing it to be true. Believing x (i.e. believing a 
position or normative claim) is not a necessary and sufficient condition for accepting x. Not only 
must one believe x, but one must also treat this belief as a fully integrated unit of one’s reasons 
for acting. Helmreich calls this “internalizing” the normative claim. Internalizing a normative 
claim involves “taking a normative claim as one’s own, adopting it as something that bears on 
one’s reasons for action.”39 This is contrasted with simply agreeing with a normative claim and 
not having it function as a consideration when actually deciding to take action. For example, I 
                                                          
38 Jeffrey S. Helmreich, “Taking a Stance: an Account for Persons and Institutions,” in A. Capone, M. Carapezza, 
and F. Lo Piparo, Further Advances in Pragmatics and Philosophy, Part 2 (Springer: 2019): 513-528.  
39 Helmreich, “Taking a Stance.”  
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may understand that I should quit smoking. Smoking increases my chances of contracting 
various types of lung disease, such as emphysema, chronic bronchitis and lung cancer. I agree 
that these are reasons for me to quit. But it is still plausible for a smoker to say, as he lights up 
another cigarette, “Yes, I know I should quit smoking because I want to live a long life.” On 
Helmreich’s view, the smoker agrees with the normative claim that he should quit smoking but 
has not internalized this as a reason to quit. It is not internalized as a reason to quit because a.) he 
does not quit and b.) he does not seem disposed to quit, i.e. there does not seem to be a possible 
world in which he would quit even if the perfect quitting conditions obtained. So even if the 
smoker consents to the normative claim, he is not stance-taking because the normative claim is 
not internalized.40  
We are now in a position to evaluate the well-behaved psychopath. He is someone who 
actively seeks to understand the rules governing a particular social practice because he wants to 
be a productive, contributing member of that practice. Although he is insincere with respect to 
regretful expressives, he is stance-taking with respect to the normative claims of his desired 
social practice which includes regretful utterances. We can say that the well-behaved psychopath 
has substituted internalized normative claims for the lack of internal emotion. Since he is 
agreeing with the ways in which regretful speech acts are performed and has internalized these 
speech acts so that he will do them when the occasion permits, he is satisfying an alternative 
condition of sincerity which is that of stance-taking. Well-behaved psychopaths, then, seem to 
meet the conditions of the second version of the authenticity view.  
                                                          
40 Helmreich, “Taking a Stance”: “Of course, one may not be motivated at all by a normative claim one takes oneself 
to have accepted; such a person would then not be in a stance, for a stance is essentially constituted by a disposition 
to act in certain ways for the right reasons. It involves both accepting the normative claim, together with being 
disposed to act in light of it.” 
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One could object to this account of stance-taking on the grounds that it does not differentiate 
between the paradigmatic and well-behaved psychopath. Consider this case:  
Bundy, a paradigmatic psychopath, endeavors to smuggle a Tibetan Mastiff puppy from his 
neighbor’s home. Bundy has just learned that similar breed sold for two million dollars, so he 
is sufficiently motivated to make what he considers “easy money.”41 For two weeks, Bundy 
learns more about the neighborhood’s regular events and internalizes them so that he can act 
on them to impress his neighbor. It works. After seeing Bundy contributing to the welfare of 
the neighborhood and appearing to be the personification of neighborly spirit, Bundy’s 
neighbor asks if Bundy can look after the puppy while he, the neighbor, is away on business. 
Bundy agrees, then steals it.  
It seems like Bundy has satisfied all of the conditions of stance-taking but he is insincere with 
respect to his internalized normative considerations. He acts on these considerations but for all of 
the wrong reasons. This is different from the well-behaved psychopath who, in the same 
situation, would be moved to act for all of the right reasons. But, what is the relevant difference? 
In our example, the normative considerations are ways one should behave to be a good neighbor. 
This includes the means necessary to bring it about, such as: showing up to neighborhood 
gatherings, volunteering to help move furniture, baking cookies for the kids, etc. It also includes 
being aware of the end, which in this case is communal harmony or an atmosphere of ideal 
neighborliness. Whether the end is explicitly stated or not, it is implied and should be understood 
when internalizing the normative considerations. The paradigmatic psychopath conveniently 
dismisses this implied normative consideration of communal harmony while the well-behaved 
psychopath does not. The well-behaved psychopath, therefore, can sincerely express regret.  
                                                          
41 Apparently, in 2014, this was the most expensive dog breed in the world. Jenny Cosgrave. "World's Most 
Expensive Dog? Pup Sold for $2 Million." CNBC. March 19, 2014. 
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V. Conclusion 
This chapter was focused on showing that displays of regret can be socially valuable. Regret 
in the social realm can be understood as a performance. From this view, acts of regret are 
meaningful to those taking part in the social practice and serve as commentary on what the agent 
thinks and feels in respect to the regretful event. Regret was also shown to have a regulative and 
symbolic function similar to that of etiquette. The benefit of the regulative function is that regret 
can ease and obviate social tension. The symbolic function allows others to know how the agent 
evaluates the social practice in which he engages. This is beneficial to all involved. We also 
discussed the problematic case of the well-behaved psychopath who is able to follow social rules 
but nevertheless appears inauthentic. We saw two versions of how the well-behaved psychopath 
could be considered authentic. First, he is authentic because he acts in a way that expresses his 
creativity and he also acts in a way that corresponds to his inner social self. We concluded that 
he is being authentic when he chooses and acts in accordance with a social role. Second, he is 
authentic because he is able to utter regretful expressions sincerely. He does this because 
displaying regret is a form of stance-taking, whose sincerity conditions he can meet despite his 
lack of genuine regretful feeling. Consequently, the benefit of socially displaying regret extends 
beyond normal moral agents to abnormal ones, as is the case with well-behaved psychopaths. 
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